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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
This Report examines the language, history and purpose of
the double jeopardy clause of the fifth amendment. It concludes
that the clause prohibits government appeals in felony cases
whenever a reversal would result in a new trial.
As the Report points out, the government's inability to appeal
from acquittals where the appeal would result in a new trial does
impede the search for truth in criminal justice. However, this
inability to appeal in felony cases is well grounded in the origi-
nal meaning of the fifth amendment's guarantee that no person
shall be "subject for the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy
of life or limb."
Although historical evidence suggests that the prohibition on
government appeals which would result in new trials does not
apply where the acquittal was based on a defective indictment,
the Report does not recommend challenging a venerable line of
cases to the contrary. Similarly, while the evidence is quite
strong that the prohibition applies only to felonies, precedent
invoking the double jeopardy clause in misdemeanor cases is
firmly enough established to counsel against urging the distinc-
tion between felonies and misdemeanors.
The Report does, however, recommend that the Department
consider seeking explicit judicial recognition of the government's
right to appeal errors of law in a bench trial, when findings of
fact clearly support a guilty verdict on proper application of the
substantive law. Such an appeal right is fully supported by the
fifth amendment's original meaning, and does not appear to be
at odds with recent case law. On the negative side, judicial rec-
ognition of such an appeal right might encourage a larger pro-
portion of defendants to opt for a trial by jury, rather than a
bench trial. Such a development might increase the incidence of
wrongful acquittals.
Finally, the Report suggests that a further study be under-
taken to explore additional ways of accomodating the govern-
ment's need to seek correction of legal error, while still preserv-
ing the defendant's constitutional immunity from retrial. Such a
study might examine: (1) whether government appeals of errors
of law in jury trial by special verdict could be allowed, consistent
with the sixth amendment's guarantee of a trial by jury in crimi-
nal prosecutions; and (2) the possible use of pretrial appealable
orders framing charges to the jury, and resolving evidentiary is-
sues in advance of trial.
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As part of a continuing series of papers on impediments to the
search for truth in criminal investigation and adjudication, the
Office of Legal Policy has carried out a review of the law gov-
erning double jeopardy prohibitions on federal government ap-
peals of criminal acquittals. These prohibitions undermine the
search for truth in criminal adjudication by allowing some
wrongly acquitted, culpable individuals to go unpunished. The
results of our review are set out in this Report.
Under current American law, state and federal prosecutors are
not authorized to appeal a judgment of acquittal handed down
by the finder of fact, despite any errors favorable to the defen-
dant that may have been committed at trial. A convicted defen-
dant is not, however, similarly restricted; he is authorized to ap-
peal on grounds of error. This disparity of treatment
undermines the search for truth in criminal justice. Culpable in-
dividuals who have been convicted may nevertheless be set free
as a result of technical errors committed at trial. At the same
time, culpable individuals who have erroneously been acquitted
because of mistakes by the fact finder or errors of law are
shielded from government appeals that could have corrected
trial court errors. As a result, society's interest in ferreting out
the truth and punishing those who have committed crimes is
compromised. As Justice Holmes stated in arguing for the con-
stitutionality of federal government appeals of acquittals, "[a]t
the present time in this country there is more danger that
criminals will escape justice than that they will be subjected to
tyranny."' That statement rings even truer today than it did
over eighty years ago. Allowing prosecutors to appeal erroneous
acquittals would not lead to governmental tyranny; to the con-
trary, it would further the interests of justice.
Whether appeals of acquittals are constitutionally permissible
is, however, an entirely separate question. In order to address
1. Kepner v. United States, 195 U.S. 100, 134 (1904) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
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that question in a principled fashion, this Report analyzes the
original meaning of the double jeopardy clause.
Part I of this Report examines the original meaning of the
double jeopardy clause. After setting forth eighteenth-century
definitions of the double jeopardy clause's key terms and tracing
the development of the double jeopardy concept in England and
in the American colonies, Part I analyzes the insertion of the
double jeopardy clause into the fifth amendment of the Consti-
tution. An analysis of the circumstances surrounding that
clause's enactment in light of the eighteenth century under-
standing of the double jeopardy principle reveals that the double
jeopardy clause in general was aimed at preventing multiple tri-
als or punishments for the same felony. That purpose suggests
that government appeals of felony acquittals resulting in new
trials, subject to a few possible exceptions, would run afoul of
the double jeopardy clause. The evils of multiple trials or pun-
ishments would not, however, be implicated by government ap-
peals of felony acquittals not resulting in new trials. Accord-
ingly, while the matter is not free from doubt, we conclude that
the double jeopardy clause should not be read to prohibit gov-
ernment appeals of felony acquittals that do not result in new
trials. We also conclude that the double jeopardy clause, read in
accordance with its original meaning, does not apply to misde-
meanor cases.
Part II of the Report surveys federal case law development of
the Constitution's double jeopardy clause, with particular atten-
tion paid to the treatment of appeals from verdicts. This survey
reveals that the federal courts have consistently adhered to the
rule that the double jeopardy clause bars federal government ap-
peals of acquittals, if those appeals would result in new trials.
Nevertheless, recent case law indicates that the government re-
tains substantial authority to appeal judicial determinations
providing for the release of criminal defendants, as long as those
determinations do not constitute "acquittals" by the trier of
fact.
Part III of the Report briefly reviews the double jeopardy
treatment of government appeals from acquittals in the states
and in selected foreign jurisdictions. Early state case law hold-
ings did not authorize government appeals of acquittals. Before
1969 (the year in which the federal double jeopardy clause was
made fully applicable to the states through the fourteenth
amendment) the vast majority of the states barred the govern-
ment from appealing acquittals. Only two jurisdictions (Con-
necticut and Wisconsin) explicitly authorized such appeals from
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errors of law in all cases. Two additional states (Arkansas and
West Virginia) only allowed appeals of acquittals when the in-
fraction charged was a minor misdemeanor not punishable by
imprisonment. Four jurisdictions (Arkansas, Kentucky, Missis-
sippi, and North Carolina) only allowed appeals of acquittals se-
cured by the defendant's fraud or collusion. England does not
authorize the government to appeal acquittals. Several common-
wealth nations, however (Canada, New Zealand, India, Ceylon,
South Africa, and the Australian State of Tasmania) allow ques-
tions of law to be appealed following an acquittal. The govern-
ment generally may appeal acquittals in civil law nations.
Part IV briefly explores the policy ramifications of the double
jeopardy clause's application to appeals of acquittals. First, we
quickly survey policy arguments advanced in favor of allowing
the government to appeal acquittals. We conclude that while
those policy arguments are strong, they must give way to the
results of our original meaning analysis, which suggests that sub-
ject to a few exceptions, only appeals not requiring new trials in
felony cases are constitutionally permissible. Next, we suggest a
possible approach, rooted in recent case law, for highlighting the
proper scope of the United States' ability to make constitution-
ally permissible appeals of acquittals. Such an approach might
emphasize that the double jeopardy clause in no way bars ap-
peals of acquittals, when such appeals do not result in new tri-
als. Consistent with this approach, we recommend that the Jus-
tice Department consider seeking an appropriate case to argue
that the government is entitled to appeal a bench trial acquittal,
on the ground of legal error, when correction of the error would
allow a verdict of guilty to be entered without a new trial. We
discuss the potential drawbacks, as well as the possible benefits,
of establishing a limited governmental right to appeal bench
trial acquittals. We close this Report by suggesting that a follow-
up study be done of additional ways in which society's interest
in ascertaining the truth in criminal proceedings can be served
through government appeals that do not violate the double jeop-
ardy clause. Such a study might examine (1) whether govern-
ment appeals of errors of law in jury trials by special verdict
could be allowed, consistent with the sixth amendment's guaran-
tee of the right to a trial by jury in criminal prosecutions; and
(2) the possible use of pretrial appealable orders (agreed upon at
a pretrial conference) framing charges to the jury and resolving
evidentiary issues.
Double Jeopardy
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I. THE ORIGINAL MEANING OF THE DOUBLE JEOPARDY CLAUSE
Part I of this Report assesses the original meaning of the
double jeopardy clause, with particular reference to the appeal-
ability of acquittals. First, we survey eighteenth century defini-
tions of the double jeopardy clause's key terms. Because these
definitions, in and of themselves, shed relatively little light on
the appealability of acquittals, we then turn to historical
sources. After surveying the history of the double jeopardy con-
cept in England and in America, we discuss the circumstances
surrounding the adoption of the United States Constitution's
double jeopardy clause. Finally, taking into account eighteenth
century definitions and historical analysis, we then set forth
what we believe to be the probable original meaning of the
double jeopardy clause, as applied to government appeals of
acquittals.
A. The Words Of The Double Jeopardy Clause
The fifth amendment's double jeopardy clause specifies, "nor
shall any person be subject for the same offense to be twice put
in jeopardy of life or limb." An effort to understand the original
meaning of this provision should begin with an examination of
eighteenth and early nineteenth century dictionary definitions of
its key terms-"same," ''offense," "jeopardy," "life,"
and "limb."
Noah Webster's 1828 American Dictionary defines "same" as
"[ildentical; not different or other."'2 This definition confirms
the common sense understanding that the double jeopardy
clause prohibits the government from placing a person twice in
jeopardy for the identical offense.
"Offense" ["offence"] is defined by Samuel Johnson's 1755
Dictionary as "crime; act of wickedness."' Giles Jacob's 1772
Law Dictionary defines "offense" ["offence"] as "an act commit-
ted against a law or omitted where the law requires it, and pun-
ishable by it . . . . [A]I1 offenses are capital, or not: capital,
those for which the offender shall lose his life: not capital, where
an offender may forfeit his lands and goods, be fined and suffer
2. N. WEBSTER, AMERICAN DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (1828) (reissued
1967) [hereinafter WEBSTER's DICTIONARY].
3. S. JOHNSON, A DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (2d ed. 1755) [hereinafter
JOHNSON'S DICTIONARY].
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corporal punishment, or both; but not loss of life."4 Similarly,
Webster defines "offense" as "[a]ny transgression of law, divine
or human."'5 In short, it appears that the word "offense" in the
double jeopardy clause should be read as having meant origi-
nally a crime punishable by law.
The word "twice" is defined by Webster as "[tiwo times ....
[d]oubly." 6 This definition accords with the modern understand-
ing of that word, indicating that the double jeopardy clause pro-
hibits the government from placing an individual two times
("doubly") in jeopardy.
The word "jeopardy" is not defined by Johnson or by Jacob,
but Webster's Dictionary states that "jeopardy" means
"[ejxposure to death, loss or injury; hazard; danger; peril."'7 This
suggests that the word "jeopardy" in the double jeopardy clause
should be read to have meant "risk," "danger," or "peril." While
the phrase "twice in jeopardy" or "double jeopardy" may have
been a term of art, we have identified only one eighteenth cen-
tury case law or treatise reference to "double jeopardy." In
Respublika v. Shaffer,8 a Pennsylvania court stated without ci-
tation that "[b]y the [common] law it is declared that no man
shall be twice put in jeopardy for the same offense. . . . [This
prohibits] the oppression of a double trial."9 This statement sug-
gests that "double jeopardy" or "twice in jeopardy" possibly
may have been viewed as a shorthand reference to prohibitions
on retrials for the same offense. We believe, however, that this
possible inference should not be accorded a great deal of weight,
given the absence of any other recorded references to double
jeopardy as a term of art. Other eighteenth century American
lawyers and judges may have assigned a somewhat different
meaning (or, alternatively, the same meaning) to the phrase
"double jeopardy"; we simply do not know.
The term "life or limb" is not defined in the eighteenth and
early nineteenth century dictionaries that we have examined.
"Life" is defined by Jacob as "[ulnion and co-operation of soul
with body; enjoyment or possession of terrestrial existence." 10
Similarly, Webster states that "in man, [life is] that state of be-
4. G. Jacob, NEw LAW DIC'rIONARY (9th ed. 1772) [hereinafter JACOB's DICTIONARY].
5. WEBSTER'S DICTIONARY, supra note 2.
6. Id.
7. Id. Our research provides no clear indication that the phrases "jeopardy" or
"double jeopardy" were legal terms of art in the eighteenth century.
8. 1 Dall. 137 (Pa. Oyer and Terminer 1788).
9. Id.
10. JACOB'S DICTIONARY, supra note 4.
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ing in which the soul and body are united."" Webster states
that a "limb" is "an extremity of the human body; a member;
* . .as the arm or leg."" The verb "to limb" is, according to
Johnson, "[t]o tear asunder;"" Webster defines "to limb" as
"[t]o dismember; to tear off the limbs."" Read literally, these
definitions would appear to suggest that jeopardy to "life or
limb" referred to processes that put a person in peril of losing
his life or having his limbs dismembered.
We believe, however, that the term "life or limb" was a term
of art that was not meant to be read literally. The historical
meaning of this term can be gleaned by reference to Lord Coke's
seventeenth century definition of the phrase "life or member.""
The Second Part of Coke's Commentaries defines the phrase
"judgment of life or member" ("jugment de vie et de membre")
as meaning "he shall be attainted of felony."" Similarly, the
Third Part of the Commentaries says of the term "U]udgment
of life or member" that "[t]hese words do imply felony.' 7 Con-
sistent with these definitions, the 1848 edition of Dwarris' Trea-
tise on Statutes states that "[e]very crime, the perpetrator of
which is, by any statute, ordained to have judgment of life or
member, is a felony: although the word felony be not contained
in the statute."' This statement in an early nineteenth century
treatise strongly suggests that Lord Coke's seventeenth century
understanding of the term "life or member" still held sway in
the eighteenth century. Accordingly, substituting the word
"limb" for "member," we believe it highly probable that the
term "life or limb" originally was meant as a reference to crimes
punishable as felonies. Felonies were offenses punishable by for-
feiture of lands or goods, plus additional punishment, if so speci-
fied by the law."'
11. WEBSTER'S DICTIONARY, supra note 2.
12. Id. Similarly, JOHNSON'S DICTIONARY, supra note 3, states that a limb is "a
member".
13. JOHNSON'S DICTIONARY, supra note 3.
14. WEBSTmR'S DICTIONARY, supra note 2.
15. Given the fact that WESTER'S DICTIONARY, supra note 2, defines "limb" as
"member" (see supra text accompanying note 12), we believe that it is entirely justifiable
to read the phrase "life or limb" merely as an alternative formulation of the term "life or
member."
16. E. COKE, THE SECOND PART OF THE INsTrrTs OF THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 434 (6th
ed. 1681).
17. E. COKE, THE THIRD PART OF THE INsTrruTES OF THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 91 (1644
ed.).
18. F. DWARRIS, A GENERAL TREATISE ON STATUTES 673 (2d ed. 1848).
19. Blackstone defined a "felony" as "an offense which occasions a total forfeiture of
either land or goods, or both, at the common law, and to which capital or other punish-
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Putting these definitions together, the words of the double
jeopardy clause appear to prohibit the government from twice
placing any person in peril of suffering punishment as a felon for
the same act. It is conceivable-though by no means cer-
tain-that the clause may also have been understood to prohibit
the retrial of an individual on the same felony charge. This read-
ing, in and of itself, is not highly illuminating-it tells us very
little about the practical scope of the double jeopardy clause.
Specifically, it does not answer the questions of whether and
under what circumstances government appeals of acquittals
would violate the clause. To shed light on these questions, it is
necessary to consider the historical development of the double
jeopardy concept in England and in America.
B. Historical Development Of The Double Jeopardy Concept
The double jeopardy concept has a long and complicated his-
tory. 0 The following discussion will summarize those aspects of
that history that are relevant to the issue of government appeals
of acquittals. After reviewing the development of the double
jeopardy concept in England and in America, we will examine
the formulation of the Bill of Rights' double jeopardy clause.
1. The Development of Double Jeopardy in England2 1
No reference to double jeopardy appears in the Magna Carta.
Nevertheless, by the late thirteenth century the glimmerings of
ment may be superadded, according to the degree of guilt." 4 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMEN-
TARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND *95 (W. Jones ed. 1916) (text based on 1788 edition)
[hereinafter 4 W. BLACKSTONE]. According to Blackstone, felonies included, among
others, such crimes as murder, petit larceny, robbery, arson, desertion from the King's
army, rape, and bigamy. Id. *97-99, *102, *163, *194, *210, *221, and *242. Blackstone
added that, "in common usage, the word 'crimes' is made to denote such offenses as are
of a deeper and more atrocious dye; while smaller faults, and omissions of less conse-
quence, are comprised under the gentler term of 'misdemeanors' only." Id. *5. These
definitions do not establish the clear distinction between felonies and misdemeanors
found in modern American law. Indeed, Blackstone's statement that "properly speaking,
[crimes and misdemeanors] are mere synonymous terms" appears to imply that, accord-
ing to "proper" usage (as opposed to "common" usage), felonies are a subcategory of the
class of all misdemeanors (or crimes). Id. *5.
20. For comprehensive overviews of the double jeopardy concept's historical develop-
ment, see M. FRIEDLAND, DOUBLE JEOPARDY (1969) and J. SIGLER, DOUBLE JEOPARDY
(1969).
21. The following discussion of the early development of double jeopardy draws
largely upon J. SIGLER, supra note 20, at 1-37.
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a former judgment barrier offering partial protection from rep-
rosecution were apparent. 2 The attempt to restrain private
complainants from instigating repeated prosecutions was codi-
fied in 1281 in the Statute of Westminster."3 By the fourteenth
century, the plea of "autrefois acquit," or "formerly acquitted,"
had begun to develop, whereby a defendant could seek to block
a second trial by citing his previous acquittal of the same
offense.
During double jeopardy's early development, criminal proce-
dures could be instituted either by common law "appeal" (at the
behest of a private party) or by "indictment" (at the behest of
the crown)." By the early fifteenth century it was settled by
statute that an acquittal after a jury trial on charges initiated by
appeal was a bar to prosecution for the same offense by subse-
quent indictment."' Conversely, an acquittal on an indictment
was deemed a bar to the initiation of a suit by appeal on the
part of the injured party,2' but this was altered by the Statute of
1487. T After the Statute, neither a conviction nor an acquittal
on an indictment acted as a bar to a prosecution by way of ap-
peal, for the same offense, if the appeal was brought within a
year and a day of the conviction or 'acquittal.
By the seventeenth century, English double jeopardy protec-
tion had evolved into four common law pleas: autrefois acquit
(former acquittal), autrefois convict (former conviction), au-
trefois attaint (former attainder), and pardon. Those pleas, re-
ferred to in Coke's Institutes,5 were described in some detail a
century later in Blackstone's Commentaries."9 They prevented
the retrial of a person who had previously been acquitted, con-
victed, attainted (adjudged worthy of punishment), or pardoned
for the same offense. Blackstone explained autrefois acquit as
follows:
22. See id. at 12-13, citing 1 BRrrroN, DE LEGiBUS ANGLICANES 104, 112 (Nichols
trans. 1865). According to Sigler, an acquitted individual could not be reprosecuted at
the instance of the original accusing private party, but apparently could be reprosecuted
at the instance of the crown.
23. 13 Edw. I, c. 12 (1281). The Statute of Westminster stipulated that the fact that
"the life of the defendant was in jeopardy" in a previous case resulting in the defendant's
acquittal was the basis for a suit of malicious prosecution against the appellors.
24. The criminal appeal was not abolished (by statute) until 1819. 59 Geo. III, c. 46
(1819).
25. 9 Hen. V, fo. 2, pl. 7 (1421); 34 Hen. VI, fo. 9, pl. 19 (1455).
26. Trin. 21 Edw. III, fo. 23, pl. 16 (1346); Mich. 44 Edw. III, fo. 38, pl. 35 (1369).
27. 9 Hen. VII, c. 1 (1487).
28. E. COKE, THE THtRD PART OF THE INSTITUTES OF THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 212-14
(1st ed. 1642)(1797 ed.).
29. See 4 W. BLACKSTONE, supra note 19, at *335-37.
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First, the plea of autrefois acquit, or a former acquittal,
is grounded on this universal maxim of the common law
of England, that no man is to be brought into jeopardy of
his life more than once for the same offense. And hence it
is allowed as a consequence that when a man is once
fairly found not guilty upon any indictment, or other
prosecution, before any court having competent jurisdic-
tion of the offense, he may plead such acquittal in bar of
any subsequent accusation for the same crime. Therefore,
an acquittal on an appeal is a good bar to an indictment
on the same offense. And so, also, was an acquittal on an
indictment a good bar to an appeal by the common law;
and therefore, in favor of appeals, a general practice was
introduced not to try any person on an indictment of
homicide till after the year and day within which appeals
may be brought were past, by which time it often hap-
pened that the witnesses died, or the whole was forgot-
ten. To remedy which inconvenience the statute 3 Henry
VIII, c.1 (Star Chamber, 1487), enacts that indictments
shall be proceeded on, immediately, at the king's suit for
the death of a man, without waiting for bringing an ap-
peal, and that the plea of autrefois acquit on an indict-
ment shall be no bar to the prosecuting of any appeal.30
In short, according to Blackstone, once an individual had been
"fairly" tried and acquitted of a crime in a proceeding brought
by common law appeal, he could not be charged with the same
offense in a subsequent indictment. By virtue of being found
"not guilty," an acquitted individual would be "forever quit and
discharged of the accusation, except he be appealed of felony
within the time limited by law."' 31 While an acquittal following
an indictment in principle did not bar a future prosecution by
way of common law appeal, Blackstone stated that by his time
private appeals had "ceased to be in common use. "32
30. Id. at *335-36. (In this passage Blackstone employed the term "appeal" to desig-
nate a criminal charge brought at the behest of a private party-not to signify an appel-
late proceeding in the modern sense.) In a similar vein, Hawkins' analysis of autrefois
acquit revealed "that an Acquittal in one County for [a particular offense] . . . may be
pleaded in Bar of a subsequent Prosecution for the same [offense] . . . in another
County." 2 W. HAWKINS, A TREATISE OF THE PLEAS OF THE CROWN (1724 ed.), reprinted in
AMERICAN LAW: THE FORMATVE YEARS 370 (S. Katz & M. Horwitz eds. 1972).
31. 4 W. BLACKSTONE, supra note 19, at *361.
32. Id. at *316. The unpopularity of private appeals stemmed from the fact that the
appellor would be imprisoned and fined in the event of the appellee's acquittal. Id. As
stated supra in note 24, the private appeal was formally abolished in 1819.
Double Jeopardy
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In eighteenth century England, the pleas of autrefois acquit
and autrefois convict could be interposed only on the basis of an
actual verdict of acquittal or conviction. 3 Accordingly, in mod-
ern American terms, "jeopardy attached" for purposes of invok-
ing those pleas at the time an acquittal or conviction was en-
tered. This standard for determining when jeopardy attaches
remains in force today in England."
A richer understanding of the development of double jeopardy
during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries can be gleaned
from English cases. In 1660, the Court of King's Bench held that
the Crown prosecutor had no right to seek a new trial after an
acquittal.3 5 The court noted (without specific citation) that on
two instances during Cromwell's rule a prosecutor's appeal had
been allowed. Those holdings, however, were deemed non-bind-
ing, inasmuch as they were "in the late troublesome times, and
by the parties' assent."" Why the accused assented to a new
trial was not explained. One year later, in Rex v. Jackson,7 the
court denied a motion for a new trial following an acquittal for
perjury. The court noted that the acquittal had been secured by
the beating and private imprisonment of the witnesses to per-
jury. The court reporter explained simply that the new trial mo-
tion "was denied, it being in a criminal case, wherein the party
being once acquitted, shall never be tried again."3 The court re-
affirmed these holdings in Rex v. Fenwick & Holt. 9 The court's
reasoning in Fenwick & Holt was summarized by the eighteenth
century legal treatise writer Charles Viner:
[A] report of this case communicated to me from a man-
uscript of Lord Chief Justice Kelyng, he says, that Hyde
C. J. Twisden and himself agreed, that no trial ought to
be where the party was once acquitted for any crime that
concerns life, or member, or which would make the party
infamous; and says the mischief might be very great if
the party should be put to a new trial, for then his adver-
sary would see where he failed, and might use ill means
to prove what he failed in before; and that upon search,
33. The requirement of a verdict of conviction or acquittal was definitively estab-
lished in Turner's Case, 89 Eng. Rep. 158 (1676); see also J. ARCHBOLD, PLEADING, EVI-
DENCE & PRACTICE IN CRIMINAL CASES §§ 435-459 (35th ed. 1962).
34. See 11 HALSEURY'S LAWS OF ENGLAND para. 242 (4th ed. 1976).
35. Rex v. Read, 1 Lev. 9, 83 Eng. Rep. 271 (K.B. 1660).
36. Id.
37. 1 Lev. 124, 83 Eng. Rep. 330 (K.B. 1661).
38. Id.
39. 1 Keb. 546, 83 Eng. Rep. 1104 (1663).
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no precedent was found that ever any new trial was
granted in such case except two in the time of the late
troubles, which his brother Twisden said were by con-
sent, and that the Court did not regard those precedents,
as differing from all in good time.40
This language indicates a belief that the prosecution should not
be entitled to "see where it failed" at the first trial in order to
perfect its case at retrial.
Subsequent holdings adhered to the principle that no new
trial would be granted following an acquittal. For example, in
Rex v. Davis,4" following defendants' acquittal for assault, the
prosecution obtained affidavits of fact tending to show defend-
ants' guilt. The court denied the prosecution's motion for a new
trial, stating that "there could be no precedent shown for it [a
new trial] in case of acquittal."'" In Rex v. Jones,5 the court
opined that "it is inconsistent with reason not to grant a new
trial where a man is acquitted by his own artifice of a crime not
capital; for it is unjust (as hath been observed), that where a
man hath committed one crime, he shall have it in his power to
avoid justice by committing another." Despite this policy con-
cern, however, the court "admitt[ed] [it] to be law" that an ac-
quittal could not be appealed." Other cases held similarly.'5
There were a few extremely limited exceptions to the rule for-
bidding appeals of acquittals. In Rex v. Furser,4 the defendant,
who had been indicted, "had entered notice of trial in the
[court's] office book," apparently without giving direct notice to
the prosecutor. The defendant was then acquitted, apparently
without the prosecutor's knowledge. The court granted a new
trial, citing a statute that required defendant to give notice of
trial. The extremely brief (14 line) case report gives no indica-
tion that any precedent prohibiting a new trial after acquittal
was being overturned, or even being considered. Accordingly,
this case is perhaps best viewed as sui generis. It may merely
40. C. VimmR, A G&NERAL AfRLDGEMEr OF LAW AND EQUnTy 479 (2d ed. 1793).
41. 1 Show. 336, 89 Eng. Rep. 609 (K.B. 1691).
42. Id.
43. 8 Mod. 201, 207, 88 Eng. Rep. 146, 149 (K.B. 1724).
44. 88 Eng. Rep. at 149. This case involved a quo warranto proceeding against indi-
viduals who had falsely claimed to hold a public office; several judges opined that this
was not a criminal proceeding at all.
45. See, e.g., Rex v. Praed, 4 Burr. 2257, 98 Eng. Rep. 177 (K.B. 1768); Rex v.
Mawbey, 6 T.R. 619, 625, 638, 101 Eng. Rep. 736, 739, 746 (K.B. 1796).
46. 96 Eng. Rep. 813 (K.B. 1753).
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reflect an understanding that the prosecution must be allowed to
appear at trial and thereby prosecute an indictment.
The other possible exceptions involved acquittals when indict-
ments had been preferred to test a civil right-mainly indict-
ments for non-repair of a highway. Eighteenth century and early
nineteenth century cases did not allow appeals from such acquit-
tals.4 By the mid-nineteenth century, however, new trials were
allowed in such cases."8 This exception was a narrow one: if the
accused was in danger of imprisonment, a new trial would not be
granted. 9
One late eighteenth century case allowed an appeal in a quo
warranto proceeding.50 This case, however, did not constitute an
exception to the rule against appeals of acquittals in criminal
cases: the court plainly stated "that of late years a quo warranto
information ha[s] been considered merely in the nature of a civil
proceeding." ' Similarly, Wilson v. Rasta1152 and Calcraft v.
Gibbs13 are not exceptions. In Wilson the court allowed a new
trial to recover penalties for bribery, when judicial error had
yielded an initial verdict favorable to the defendant. Justice
Kenyon stated that while a new trial could not be allowed in a
criminal case, "I consider this as a civil action."54 Calcraft in-
volved a dispute as to whether defendant had been poaching on
lands formerly owned by his master. In allowing a retrial follow-
ing a judgment for defendant, Justice Kenyon, citing judicial er-
ror, implicitly assumed that this was not a criminal proceeding.
The Crown apparently did have a limited right to bring a writ
of error in eighteenth century England. The 1788 edition of
Hawkins' Pleas of the Crown summarized the scope of this right
as follows:
I take it to be settled at this day, that wherever the in-
dictment, or appeal, whereon a man is acquitted, is so far
erroneous (either for want of substance in setting out the
crime, or of authority in the judge before whom it was
47. See, e.g., Rex v. Silverton, 1 Wils. 298, 95 Eng. Rep. 628 (K.B. 1751); Rex v.
Reynell, 6 East 315, 102 Eng. Rep. 1307 (K.B. 1805); Rex v. Burbon, 5 M. & S. 392, 105
Eng. Rep. 1094 (K.B. 1816).
48. See, e.g., Regina v. Cricklade, St. Sampson (1849) (referred to in Regina v. Rus-
sell, 3 El. & Bl. 942, 118 Eng. Rep. 1394, 1396 (Q.B. 1854)).
49. Regina v. Duncan, 7 Q.B.D. 198 (Q.B. 1881) (cited in M. FRIEDLAND, supra note
20, at 286, n.8); Regina v. Russell, 3 El. & Bi. 942, 118 Eng. Rep. 1394 (Q.B. 1854).
50. Rex v. Francis, 2 T.R. 484, 100 Eng. Rep. 261 (K.B. 1788).
51. Id. (emphasis added).
52. 4 T.R. 753, 100 Eng. Rep. 1238 (K.B. 1792).
53. 5 T.R. 19, 101 Eng. Rep. 11 (K.B. 1792).
54. 100 Eng. Rep. at 1286.
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taken), that no good judgment could have been given
upon it against the defendant, the acquittal can be no
bar of a subsequent indictment or appeal, because in
judgment of law the defendant was never in danger of his
life from the first; for the law will presume prima facie
that the judges would not have given a judgment, which
would have been liable to have been reversed. But if
there be no error in the indictment or appeal, but only in
the process, it seems agreed, that the acquittal will be a
good bar of a subsequent prosecution, notwithstanding
such error; the best reason whereof seems to be this,
That such error is salved by the appearance."
In short, Hawkins' summary appears to indicate that a writ of
error could be filed following an acquittal only if the initial in-
dictment was "defective" in that it failed to state an offense
("want of substance in setting out the crime") or the trial court
lacked jurisdiction ("want . . .of authority in the judge before
whom it was taken"). In those special situations, the defendant
never was in jeopardy in the first place. If, however, there was
error "in the process" by which an individual was brought
within a court's jurisdiction, an acquittal would bar that individ-
ual's reprosecution, since the defendant's appearance "cor-
rected" the error.56 Elsewhere Hawkins deemed it "settled" (pre-
sumably subject to the exceptions noted above) that a court
could not "set aside, a verdict which acquits a defendant of a
prosecution properly criminal.
'57
Hale's Pleas of the Crown also discussed the writ of error fol-
lowing an acquittal.58 Hale implicitly indicated that a writ of er-
ror could be brought if an individual was found by special ver-
dict to have committed an act that constituted a "murder or
other felony," but the court mistakenly adjudged the act com-
mitted not to be a felony. If no writ of error was brought, a plea
of "autrefois acquit" would bar a subsequent prosecution, ac-
cording to Hale. Hale also indicated that a judgment of acquittal
could be reversed if the acquittal was due to the defectiveness of
55. 2 W. HAWKINS, A TREATISE OF THE PLEAS OF THE CROWN 528 (6th ed. 1788).
56. Consistent with Hawkins' conclusion, Chitty's Treatise states that "[a] mere er-
ror in the former process ...will not render that prosecution [which resulted in an
acquittal] nugatory, because the reason which relates to errors in the indictment will not
apply, and the defendant might legally have been convicted." 1 J. CHTTY, A PRACTICAL
TREATISE OF THE CRIMINAL LAW 458 (Am. ed. 1836).
57. 2 W. HAWKINS, supra note 55, at 628.
58. The following discussion is based on 2 M. HALE, THE HISTORY OF THE PLEAS OF
THE CROWN 247-248, 394-395 (1778 ed.).
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the indictment. 9 Hale advanced no other possible grounds for
granting writs of error brought by the prosecution following an
acquittal.
Thus, eighteenth century English sources indicate that the
prosecution apparently could appeal a criminal acquittal (bring
a writ of error) in only three situations: (1) when the trial court
lacked jurisdiction (and thus the defendant was not legally in
jeopardy); (2) when the initial indictment was fatally flawed
(and thus the defendant was not legally in jeopardy); and (3)
when facts were found indicating the offense charged had been
committed, but the trial court erroneously held that the facts
found did not constitute a crime. Under all other circumstances
an acquittal could not be appealed (and the plea of autrefois ac-
quit would bar a new trial), even if errors were committed at
trial. While a few eighteenth century instances of new trials fol-
lowing "acquittals" in civil actions for penalties are recorded,
new trials following acquittals in criminal proceedings were
strictly barred.
By the eighteenth century the defendant's rights of appeal
were substantially broader than the prosecution's. Starting in
the 1670s, the court of King's Bench began to hold that a de-
fendant could obtain a new trial under certain circumstances."
Those holdings overturned earlier precedents denying defend-
ants the right to a new trial upon proof of error in the initial
trial.61 There remained, however, substantial restrictions on de-
fendants' appeal rights. Even in the eighteenth century, the de-
fendant's writ of error could not be taken in capital cases with-
out the crown's permission. 2 According to one commentator, the
court could grant a new trial after defendant brought a writ of
error, "[n]ot on the merits, but only for irregularity in the pro-
ceedings." 68 The writ of error was discretionary in misdemeanor
59. In advancing this proposition, Hale, id. at 394-95, discussed Vaux's Case, 4 Co.
Rep. 44a, 77 Eng. Rep. 992 (Q.B. 1592). In that case, Vaux was acquitted of poisoning
Ridley, on the ground that the indictment was defective because it did not expressly
allege that Ridley had received and imbibed poison. A retrial was allowed after this de-
fect was cured, and Vaux was convicted.
60. See, e.g., Rex v. Latham & Collins, 3 Keble 143, 84 Eng. Rep. 642 (K.B. 1673);
Rex v. Cornelius, 3 Keble 525, 84 Eng. Rep. 858 (K.B. 1675).
61. See, e.g., Rex v. Lewin, 2 Keble 396, 84 Eng. Rep. 248 (K.B. 1663); Rex v.
Marchant, 2 Keble 403, 84 Eng. Rep. 253 (K.B. 1663).
62. See Rex v. Wilkes, 4 Burr. 2527, 2551, 98 Eng. Rep. 327, 340 (K.B. 1770); The
Ailsbury Case (Anonymous), 1 Salk 264, 91 Eng. Rep. 232 (K.B. 1699).
63. I. CHrrrv, supra note 56, at 654.
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cases, but by the end of the eighteenth century a writ of error
could be brought "for notorious mistakes in the record.""
In sum, by the end of the eighteenth century the double jeop-
ardy principle was well entrenched in English law." That princi-
ple generally barred the crown from obtaining the reindictment
and retrial of an individual who had been acquitted of a crime.
The crown was, however, apparently authorized to appeal ac-
quittals when the original indictment was defective; when the
original trial court lacked jurisdiction; or when an error of law
caused a special verdict's factual finding of felony mistakenly to
be characterized as no felony. At the same time, English law was
beginning to recognize the right of the individual to appeal con-
victions obtained in proceedings tainted by error.
2. The Development of Double Jeopardy in America
The double jeopardy concept was exported to England's
American colonies in the seventeenth century. The Massachu-
setts Body of Liberties of 1641, an early compilation of legal
principles, provided that "[n]o man shall be twice sentenced by
civil justice for one and the same crime, offense, or trespass."
That principle, reiterated in the Massachusetts Code of 1648, in-
fluenced the development of the law in Connecticut, Pennsylva-
nia, New York, and New Jersey."
Eighteenth-century colonial legal developments confirm the
recognition accorded the double jeopardy principle in the colo-
nies. In New York, even though the plea of autrefois acquit gen-
erally was not employed, double jeopardy protection was be-
stowed upon individuals, reportedly owing to "the solicitude of
royal officials that there be no double prosecutions." 8 Specifi-
cally, it was agreed in colonial New York (consistent with En-
64. 4 STEPHEN, NEW COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 456 (1846 ed.). Accord-
ing to Stephen, if the defendant won a reversal, "he remains liable to another prosecu-
tion for the same offence; for the first being erroneous, he never was in jeopardy
thereby." Id. at 458.
65. The precise nature of double jeopardy protection was apparently not, however,
fully settled in 18th century England. Viner, for example, provided various "examples of
shifting double jeopardy rules in eighteenth century English practice." J. SIGLER. supra
note 20, at 21 (citing C. VINER, A GENERAL ABRIDGEMENT OF LAW AND EQUITY 368-73, 375
(1st ed. 1785)).
66. THE LAWS AND LIBERTIES OF MASSACHUSE'rTS 46 (M. Farrand ed. 1929).
67. See J. SIGLER, supra note 20, at 22.
68. J. GOEBEL & T. NAUGHTON, LAW ENFORCEMENT IN COLONIAL NEW YORK 589 (1944)
(quoted in J. SIGLER, supra note 20, at 25). According to Sigler, "[I]n New York the
sovereign authority restricted its use of its own powers." J. SIGLER, supra note 20, at 25.
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glish practice) that a "motion [for a new trial] did not lie after
acquittal."69 A 1783 Connecticut decision forbade the second
trial of a citizen once he had been acquitted; 0 another contem-
poraneous Connecticut holding proclaimed that "a new trial is
not to be granted, in a criminal cause, to a prosecutor, unless the
acquittal was procured by some fraud or malpractice."'" The
status of double jeopardy in Pennsylvania is reflected in a 1788
common law decision stating that "[b]y the law it is declared
that no man shall be twice put in jeopardy for the same offense
... .[This prohibits] the oppression of a double trial."' "7 In co-
lonial Virginia a criminal defendant was entitled to make a spe-
cial plea alleging a former acquittal or conviction of the identical
crime charged, or a former attainder for any felony, as well as
the fact of a pardon.73 A 1788 South Carolina case held that in a
qui tam or penal action, "the court will seldom grant [the state]
a new trial, as these kind of penal actions are considered as hard
and rigorous ones.1
7 4
The double jeopardy concept was first accorded constitutional
status in the New Hampshire Constitution of 1781.71 Article
XVI of the Constitution's Bill of Rights provided in pertinent
part: "No subject shall be liable to be tried, after an acquittal,
for the same crime or offence. '7 6 No other constitution adopted
during the revolutionary period contained a double jeopardy
clause.
69. J. GoEBmL & T. NAUGHTON, supra note 68, at 279.
70. Gilbert v. Marcy, 1 Kirby 401 (Conn. 1783).
71. Hannaball v. Spaulding, 1 Root 86, 87 (Conn. 1783).
72. Respublika v. Shaffer, I Dall. 137 (Pa. Oyer and Terminer 1788).
73. J. SIGLER, supra note 20, at 24. Those pleas, which replicate the double jeopardy
pleas described by Blackstone, reflect the fact that "[t]he Virginia criminal law tended to
be closer to English law than that of most colonies." Id.
74. Steel v. Roach, 1 S.C.L. (1 Bay) 63, 64 (1788) (denying government's motion for
new trial following verdict for defendant in trial for evasion of state revenue laws). It is
unclear from this short case report whether new trials were ever granted in qui tam or
penal actions.
75. One colonial constitution contained a res judicata clause. Section 64 of the Fun-
damental Constitutions of [North] Carolina (1669) provided that "[n]o cause shall be
twice tried in any one court, upon any reason or pretence whatsoever." J. SIGLER, supra
note 20, at 28 n.119. That clause was dropped in the state's 1776 constitution. J. SIoLER,
supra, at 28.
76. Art. XVI, New Hampshire Bill of Rights (1783), reprinted in 1 B. SCHWARTZ, THE
BILL OF RIGHTS: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 377 (1971). The second sentence in article XVI
forbade the passage of laws imposing capital punishment, without trial by jury. The New
Hampshire Constitution was drafted in 1781 and ratified by New Hampshire citizens in
1783; it went into effect in 1784. B. SCHWARTZ, supra at 374.
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3. Double Jeopardy in the Federal Constitution
A double jeopardy clause was not included in the original fed-
eral Constitution. During the state ratifying conventions, how-
ever, Maryland and New York drafted prohibitions against
double jeopardy for possible inclusion in the Constitution's Bill
of Rights. The Maryland clause provided "that there be no ap-
peal from matter of fact, or second trial after acquittal; but this
provision shall not extend to such cases as may arise in the gov-
ernment of the land or naval forces." 7 The New York clause
stated "[t]hat no Person ought to be put twice in Jeopardy of
Life or Limb for one and the same Offence, nor, unless in case of
impeachment, be punished more than once for the same Of-
fence. '7' No other state conventions proposed a double jeopardy
clause.
James Madison included a double jeopardy clause in his origi-
nal draft of the Bill of Rights. On June 8, 1789, Madison's
double jeopardy provision was proposed in the House of Repre-
sentatives as a constitutional amendment. It read as follows:
"No person shall be subject, except in cases of impeachment, to
more than one punishment or trial for the same offense.
79
The House debated the double jeopardy provision on August
17, 1789. Representative Egbert Benson of New York stated that
the House (sitting as a committee of the whole) could not agree
to the amendment as it stood, because its meaning was rather
doubtful. In providing that no person should be tried more than
once for the same offense, the clause was contrary to the estab-
lished principle that a defendant was entitled to more than one
trial, according to Benson. Benson presumed that the "humane
intention of the clause" was to prohibit more than one punish-
ment; accordingly, he moved to amend the clause by striking the
words "or trial." 0
77. B. SCHWARTZ, supra note 76, at 732. This was the third of thirteen amendments
approved by a majority of a committee appointed by the Maryland ratifying convention
to draft constitutional amendments. Those amendments were drafted at the end of
April, 1788. After a minority on the committee insisted on their right to present alterna-
tive amendments to the full state convention, the committee majority elected not to for-
ward any recommendations. Accordingly, the double jeopardy amendment was not offi-
cially adopted by the Maryland convention; it was, however, circulated in pamphlet
form. Id. at 729.
78. Id. at 912. The New York convention ratified the federal Constitution, accompa-
nied by a proposed bill of rights (including the double jeopardy clause), on July 26, 1788.
Id. at 854.
79. 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 434 (1789), reprinted in B. SCHWARTZ, supra note 76, at 1027.
80. 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 753 (1789), reprinted in B. SCHWARTZ, supra note 76, at 1111.
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Representative Roger Sherman of Connecticut approved of
Benson's motion. According to Sherman, if a person were acquit-
ted at an initial trial, he ought not to be tried a second time; but
if anything should appear in the record of the first trial, sug-
gesting that the conviction should have been set aside, the de-
fendant was entitled to the benefit of a second trial. Representa-
tive Theodore Sedgwick of Massachusetts agreed with Sherman,
insisting that instead of securing the liberty of the subject, the
clause as drafted would abridge the privileges of those who were
prosecuted.81
Representative Samuel Livermore of New Hampshire ap-
proved of the clause as drafted, which he deemed declaratory of
the law as it stood. He feared that changing the clause might
make it appear that Congress desired to change the law by im-
plication, and expose a man to the danger of more than one
trial. Representative Livermore added that according to the
"universal practice" in Great Britain and the United States, per-
sons who are guilty of crimes-but who are acquitted for want of
evidence-shall not be tried a second time for the same of-
fense. 2 Representative Livermore apparently did not address
the question of whether an acquittal due to errors of law war-
ranted a second trial.
Upon being put to a vote, Benson's motion to amend the
double jeopardy clause lost by a considerable majority. Repre-
sentative George Partridge of Massachusetts then moved to in-
sert after the words "same offense" the words "by any law of the
United States." That motion also was defeated.
83
On August 20, 1789, the double jeopardy clause as phrased by
Madison was approved by the House. On August 24, 1789, the
constitutional amendments that had been approved by the
House were submitted to the Senate. As submitted, the double
jeopardy clause remained unchanged. 4 On September 3, 1789,
the Senate substantially changed the double jeopardy clause to
read that "no person shall be twice put in jeopardy of life or
limb by any public prosecution. 8 5 The reasons underlying this
change in wording are not recorded. On September 9, 1789, the
81. 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 753-54, reprinted in B. SCHWARTZ, supra note 76, at 1111. The
record does not reveal what Representative Sedgwick believed those "privileges"
included.
82. Id.
83. Id. Sigler states that the defeat of Partridge's motion permits "the speculation by
negative inference that double jeopardy may have been intended to apply to the states
and the federal government alike." J. SIGLER, supra note 20, at 30-31.
84. J. SIGLER, supra note 20, at 31, citing 1 S. JOUR. 105 (1789).
85. 1 S. Joua. 160-68 (1789) (quoted in B. SCHWARTZ, supra note 76, at 1149).
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Senate combined and renumbered the proposed constitutional
amendments; the present day fifth amendment, which included
the double jeopardy clause, was designated Article VII. 6
A conference committee of Madison, Sherman, and John Vin-
ing of Delaware from the House met with Senate appointees on
September 21 to resolve differences with respect to the proposed
Bill of Rights. At some point, the conference committee elimi-
nated the words "by any public prosecution" from the Senate's
double jeopardy clause. The circumstances surrounding this
change are not recorded. On September 25, 1789, the Senate




In summary, the draft double jeopardy clause changed in form
significantly during its consideration by the First Congress. The
June 1789 House version read "no person shall be subject, ex-
cept in cases of impeachment, to more than one punishment or
trial for the same offense." The subsequent September 1789
Senate version stated "that no person shall twice be put in jeop-
ardy of life or limb by any public prosecution." The September
1789 House-Senate conference committee version read "no per-
son shall twice be put in jeopardy of life or limb." The final
clause as adopted by Congress (after being joined with other
clauses in the fifth amendment) read "nor shall any person be
subject for the same offense to be twice put in jeopardy of life or
limb."
The double jeopardy clause, now embedded in the fifth
amendment, was ratified by the requisite number of states, al-
though according to one scholar, "many state legislators were
not certain of its meaning."88 Over time, the federal double jeop-
ardy clause influenced state constitutional development. At pre-
sent, 35 state constitutions in total contain double jeopardy
clauses that closely resemble the federal provision.89
86. J. SIGLER, supra note 20, at 31, citing 1 S. JouR 119, 130 (1789). Although Con-
gress proposed twelve initial amendments to the Constitution, the first two were not
ratified by the states, so the remaining ten became the Bill of Rights.
87. J. SIoLER, supra note 20, at 31-32, citing 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 83, 88 (1789).
88. J. SIGLER, supra note 20, at 33. Sigler adds that "it is doubtful that Massachusetts
ever ratified the portion of the fifth amendment which affects double jeopardy." Id.,
citing Dangel, Double Jeopardy in Massachusetts, 16 B.U.L. REv. 384 (1936). Unfortu-
nately, there is virtually no recorded information on the states' reaction to the double
jeopardy clause during the ratification period.
89. J. SIGLER, supra note 20, at 33-34. According to Sigler, seven states provide con-
stitutional protection against subsequent trials only in cases of prior acquittal. Id. at 34.
In all, 45 state constitutions contain double jeopardy clauses.
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C. The Probable Meaning Of The Double Jeopardy Clause
As the foregoing historical review suggests, the text and enact-
ment history of the double jeopardy clause do not clearly estab-
lish its meaning. There is no historical evidence as to what the
Congress intended when it altered Madison's version of the
double jeopardy clause.90 The insertion of references to "jeop-
ardy" and "life or limb" suggests the possibility that New York's
proposed double jeopardy clause served as a model.9' It also
strongly indicates that the clause was meant to protect individu-
als charged with a felony, given the apparent eighteenth century
English understanding that crimes punishable by "life or mem-
ber" were felonies.9' While the phrase "life or limb" may define
the class of individuals (accused felons) protected by the clause,
that phrase does nothing to clarify the scope of the protection
afforded them. In order to address the scope of the clause's pro-
tection, we must consult extrinsic historical sources.
In his 1833 Commentaries on the Constitution, Joseph Story
opined that the double jeopardy clause applies generally to bar
second trials for the same offense, no matter what the punish-
ment.93 Story's position was probably largely correct, if the term
"offense" is interpreted as meaning "felony." As previously indi-
cated, at least one late eighteenth century American case
deemed the rule against being put "twice in jeopardy" as a pro-
hibition against a "double trial." Furthermore, as the preceding
historical discussion illustrates, by the late eighteenth century it
seems to have been a generally accepted principle in England
and America that, subject to a few exceptions, an individual
could not be retried for the same felonious transgression at the
behest of the government.9 "
90. Sigler states that "[i]n all probability, the drafters of the clause intended to alter
Madison's proposal only with a view to its clarification." Id. at 32.
91. See supra text accompanying note 78.
92. See supra text accompanying notes 15-19.
93. 3 J. STORY, CoMMEgNTARIs ON THE CONsTrruTION OF THE UNITED STATES 659
(1833). According to Story, the double jeopardy clause "is another great privilege secured
by the common law. The meaning of it is, that a party shall not be tried a second time
for the same offence, after he has once been convicted, or acquitted of the offence
charged, by the verdict of a jury, and judgment has passed thereon for or against him."
Id., citing W. HAWKINS, supra note 55, ch. 35; 4 W. BLACKSTONE, supra note 19, at *335.
94. Respublika v. Shaffer, 1 Dall. 137 (Pa. Oyer and Terminer 1788).
95. As the preceding discussion of eighteenth century English law indicates, new tri-
als following "acquittals" could only be granted in civil proceedings for penalties. This
statement does not apply, however, to new trials following criminal acquittals because
the trial court lacked jurisdiction; because the indictment was defective; or because the
trial court erroneously ruled that an offense which was found to have been committed
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That principle, embodied in Madison's version of the double
jeopardy clause, was agreed to by the House of Representatives;
the only controversy in that body centered around whether the
clause should be refined to negate an implication that a defend-
ant could not be tried again following an erroneous conviction.
As will be recalled, the original House draft of the double jeop-
ardy clause specifically prohibited "more than one . . . trial for
the same offense." The House of Representatives debate on this
version (previously summarized) shows unanimous support
(among the debaters) for the proposition that an acquitted de-
fendant should not be subject to a new trial. Indeed, Represen-
tative Livermore went so far as to state that even clearly guilty
individuals who had been acquitted for want of evidence should
not be retried. Each of the debaters focused on how best to pro-
tect the accused individual's rights; no concern was expressed at
all about promoting any governmental interest in securing con-
victions. To the contrary, the one concern expressed was that
the House's version of the double jeopardy clause might by its
terms unfairly preclude convicted defendants from securing a
new trial. Roger Sherman, who had supported the convicted de-
fendant's right to obtain a new trial in appropriate circum-
stances, sat on the House-Senate conference committee that
eliminated the House's language prohibiting "more than one
trial." In and of itself, this does not demonstrate that the final
double jeopardy clause established a convicted defendant's right
to a retrial. This evidence does render unlikely, however, the
possibility that the House-Senate version was not meant to pro-
tect an acquitted individual's right to avoid being retried.
In short, the rapid approval (apparently with little debate) of
the Senate's substitute double jeopardy clause in no way sug-
gests an essential departure from the general understanding of
the House's double jeopardy concept.96 The prohibition on plac-
ing a person "twice . . . in jeopardy" certainly echoes the
Madisonian bar to "more than one punishment or trial."'e9 His-
torical treatises indicate that "life or limb" is probably best read
was not a felony. See supra text accompanying notes 55-59. In the first two cases, the
defendant was never legally in jeopardy; and, in the third case, facts were found that
supported a verdict of guilty.
96. The deletion of Madison's prohibition on more than one trial conceivably might
be interpreted as a concession to those who believed that a convicted defendant might be
entitled to a second trial under appropriate circumstances.
97. A second trial posing the risk of punishment would once again expose an acquit-
ted individual to the danger of "death, loss or injury," Webster's definition of "jeop-
ardy." See supra text accompanying note 7. Furthermore, as previously shown, the bar
against being placed "twice in jeopardy" was viewed by at least one court as prohibiting
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as a shorthand phrase for a crime punishable as a felony."8 In
sum, while the matter is not free from doubt,"9 it seems probable
that the double jeopardy clause originally was meant to bar the
second punishment or second trial of an individual acquitted of
a felony, except perhaps in the few special situations noted
above.
1. Government Appeals Resulting in New Trials
Consistent with this most probable interpretation of the
double jeopardy clause, it would appear to follow that the clause
bars the government from appealing an acquittal of a felony, in
order to obtain a new trial, except perhaps in a few special cases.
As previously noted, Hale and Hawkins indicated that appeals
of acquittals (writs of error) were not authorized in eighteenth
century England, except in three special situations: (1) the ini-
tial trial court lacked jurisdiction; (2) the initial indictment was
defective; and (3) facts were found demonstrating that an of-
fense had been committed, but the court erroneously held as a
matter of law that the conduct was not a felony.100 Alternatively
stated, the third exception would appear to allow the govern-
ment to appeal an "acquittal" that clearly would have been a
"conviction," had the law correctly been applied to undisputed
findings of fact.
We have found no evidence bearing on the question of
whether these exceptions to the "no appeal" rule were recog-
a second trial following an acquittal. See Respublika v. Shafer, 1 Dall. 137 (Pa. Oyer and
Terminer 1788).
98. See supra text accompanying notes 15-19.
99. One commentary argues that "[t]he fact that 'jeopardy' was substituted for 'trial'
in the final version of the [fifth] [a]mendment may suggest an alternative explanation of
the Ball doctrine [which flatly bars second trials of acquitted defendants]. If the evil
about which the framers were concerned was harassment of a defendant by successive
prosecutions for the same activity, a jeopardy properly may be thought of as continuing
until the final settlement of any one prosecution. Thus. . . the correction of error upon
appeal may be viewed as a continuation of both the jeopardy and the proceeding from
which it arises." Mayers & Yarbrough, Bis Vexari: New Trials and Successive Prosecu-
tions, 74 HARv. L. REv. 1, 7 (1960) (citations omitted). We do not find this argument
convincing. No textual or historical evidence is presented in support of the implicit sug-
gestion that the substitution of the word "jeopardy" for "trial" manifests an original
understanding that, as part of "one prosecution," the second trial of an acquitted person
could be allowed following a government appeal. Moreover, as the commentary acknowl-
edges, the "one continuing jeopardy" theory "declines to take as the analytical touch-
stone of the constitutional prohibition [of double jeopardy] the pre-1790 English com-
mon law." Id. at 7 (emphasis added and citation omitted).
100. See supra text accompanying notes 55-59.
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nized in the American colonies. Even assuming that they were,
however (on the ground that colonial lawyers viewed Hale and
Hawkins' Pleas of the Crown as persuasive authorities), the gen-
eral rule barring appeals of acquittals is done very little harm. In
the first two situations cited above, the proceedings were invalid
ab initio; the accused individual actually was not placed in jeop-
ardy. In the third situation, the defendant's guilt actually had
been established; the defendant had in reality been "convicted,"
according to a correct legal classification of his actions.
2. Government Appeals Not Resulting in New Trials
We have found no textual or historical evidence bearing on
the status of government appeals of felony acquittals that do not
result in new trials.101 An appeal not for the purpose of securing
a new trial presumably would not contravene the plain words of
Madison's double jeopardy clause, which merely prohibited
"more than one punishment or trial for the same offense."
Whether such an appeal would contravene the Constitution's
double jeopardy clause-which prohibits an accused individual
being "twice put in jeopardy"-is less than apparent. Two alter-
native positions are colorable.
On the one hand, to the extent such an appeal is viewed
merely as the continuation of a single criminal proceeding, that
appeal arguably does not twice expose an accused individual to
"danger" or "peril." In support of this position, it might be
noted that Webster defines "to appeal" as "[t]o call or remove a
cause from an inferior court to a superior judge or court."' 02
Thus, an appeal involves the removal of a single cause (involving
a single jeopardy in the criminal context) to a new court, rather
than the creation of a second cause.
On the other hand, to the extent a felony "acquittal" defini-
tively sets an individual free from a charge, any appeal by its
very nature arguably exposes that individual anew to the possi-
bility of harm implied by the word "jeopardy." In support of
this position, it might be noted that Webster defines "acquittal"
as "[a] judicial setting free from the charge of an offense; as, by
verdict of a jury, or sentence of a court." If an acquittal "sets an
101. As discussed infra in Part IV of this Report, the appeal of an acquittal on the
ground of legal error might not result in a new trial, if correct application of the law to
undisputed findings of fact in the initial proceeding would have supported a verdict of
guilty.
102. WEBSTER'S DICriONARY, supra note 2.
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individual free" from a charge, the initial jeopardy flowing from
that charge has, presumably, been terminated. Thus, according
to this logic, the appeal of an acquittal (even an appeal that
would not require a new trial) inevitably exposes an individual
to jeopardy of punishment for a second time.
While the matter is not free from doubt, we believe that the
better reading is that the double jeopardy clause, as originally
understood, probably does not preclude government appeals of
felony acquittals, if such appeals would not result in new trials.
Eighteenth century commentaries and formulations of the
double jeopardy principle stressed the principle's prohibition
against second trials of individuals who had been acquit-
ted-they were not cast in terms of a prohibition against govern-
ment appeals that did not bring about new trials. 08 Similarly,
Madison's draft of the double jeopardy clause prohibited multi-
ple trials or punishments, not appeals. The limited discussion of
Madison's draft in the House of Representatives focused not on
appeals, but, rather, on multiple punishments and multiple tri-
als. (Indeed, it may be that none of the debaters had contem-
plated the possibility of an appeal not resulting in a new trial.)
There is no evidence to suggest that the final version of the
double jeopardy clause was aimed at anything other than the
twin evils of multiple punishments and multiple trials. Appeals
not resulting in new trials do not implicate those evils. For all of
these reasons, we have tentatively concluded that the double
jeopardy clause should not be deemed a barrier to appeals of
felony acquittals that would not result in new trials. We ac-
knowledge, however, that we have been unable to unearth any
case law evidence bearing directly on this conclusion.
103. This statement arguably should be slightly qualified; the Maryland state consti-
tutional convention's draft double jeopardy clause provided "that there be no appeal
from matter of fact, or second trial after acquittal". Because this clause was phrased in
the disjunctive, it is arguable that an "appeal from matter of fact" may have included
appeals that did not involve a new trial. This argument is undermined, however, by the
absence of any evidence regarding the existence in the 18th century of appeals that did
not involve new trials. Moreover, as previously noted, this double jeopardy proposal was
not adopted by the Maryland convention. See supra note 77. Blackstone's statement
that "an acquittal on an indictment [was] a good bar to an appeal by the common law"
(see supra text accompanying note 30) is not a second possible qualification. In that
passage, Blackstone employed the word "appeal" to designate an original criminal pro-
ceeding brought at the behest of a harmed individual; he was not referring to the re-
moval of a criminal proceeding from a lower court to a higher court.
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D. Summary
Analysis of the double jeopardy clause's original meaning
prompts the following three tentative conclusions: (1) the clause
was intended to apply only to felony cases (i.e., individuals ac-
quitted of misdemeanors do not appear to be protected by the
double jeopardy clause); 04 (2) the clause appears to prohibit the
government from appealing an acquittal of a felony, if a success-
ful appeal would result in a new trial-except perhaps when the
trial court lacked jurisdiction, the initial indictment was defec-
tive,1 5 or the law was mistakenly applied to undisputed findings
of fact indicating guilt; and (3) while the matter is subject to
doubt, the clause probably does not prohibit the government
from appealing an acquittal of a felony, if a successful appeal
would not result in a new trial.
II. FEDERAL CASE LAW DEVELOPMENT OF THE FEDERAL DOUBLE
JEOPARDY CLAUSE WITH PARTICULAR ATTENTION TO APPEALS
The double jeopardy clause of the fifth amendment provides
''nor shall any person be subject for the same offense to be twice
put in jeopardy of life or limb."'0 6 This section briefly surveys
the federal case law development of that provision, with particu-
lar attention to its applicability to appeals.
A. Historical Summary Of The Cases
1. Key Nineteenth Century Cases
The first Supreme Court decision to provide a substantive
construction of the double jeopardy clause was Ex Parte
Lange. 0 17 A jury convicted the defendant in Lange of violating a
104. This conclusion is at odds with the Supreme Court's holding in Ex parte Lange,
85 U.S. (18 Wall.) 163 (1873), discussed infra at notes 107-08 and accompanying text.
105. This conclusion is at odds with United States v. Ball, 163 U.S. 662 (1896), dis-
cussed infra at notes 111-15 and accompanying text.
106. U.S. CoNsTr. amend. V.
107. 85 U.S. (18 Wall.) 163 (1873). The few earlier Supreme Court cases dealing with
the double jeopardy clause had not attempted to define the scope of protection afforded
by that clause. For example, in United States v. Perez, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 579 (1824)
(Story, J.), the Court never even directly mentioned the clause in holding that the dis-
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federal statute that prohibited the theft of mail bags. The stat-
ute specified a penalty of imprisonment for not more than one
year or a fine of not more than $200. The trial judge, however,
sentenced the convicted defendant to one year in prison and a
$200 fine. The defendant began his prison term immediately and
paid the fine the next day. After five days, the defendant was
returned to the trial court for the purpose of vacating the prior
judgment. The court vacated the first judgment and sentenced
the defendant to one year in prison, without giving defendant
credit for the fine paid or reimbursing him. On appeal, the Su-
preme Court held that the resentencing of the defendant vio-
lated the double jeopardy clause. (Thus, the court ordered that
the prisoner be released, inasmuch as the sentence under which
he was being held was without authority.) The Court's interpre-
tation of the clause has been cited in numerous subsequent
double jeopardy cases:
If there is anything settled in the jurisprudence of En-
gland and America, it is that no man can be twice law-
fully punished for the same offense. And although there
have been nice questions in the application of this rule to
cases in which the act charged was such as to come
within the definition of more than one statutory offence,
or to bring the party within the jurisdiction of more than
one court, there has never been any doubt of its entire
and complete protection of the party when a second pun-
ishment is proposed in the same court, on the same facts,
for the same statutory offense. 0 8
charge of an individual charged with a capital offense due to a hung jury did not pre-
clude that individual's retrial.
108. 85 U.S. (18 Wall.) at 168. The Court in Lange also concluded that the double
jeopardy clause protects individuals charged with misdemeanors as well as those accused
of felonies:
If we reflect that at the time this maxim [that no man shall more than once be
placed in peril upon the same accusation] came into existence almost every of-
fense was punished with death or other punishment touching the person, and
that these pleas [autrefois acquit and autrefois convict] are now held valid in
felonies, minor crimes, and misdemeanors alike,. . . we shall see ample reason
for holding that the principle intended to be asserted by the constitutional pro-
vision [the Double Jeopardy Clause] must be applied to all cases where a second
punishment is attempted to be inflicted for the same offense by a judicial
sentence.
Id. at 173. This holding appears to be at odds with original meaning: the term "life or
limb" apparently was understood as referring to felonies in the eighteenth century. See
supra text accompanying notes 15-19. We do not believe, however, that any attempt to
overturn the Lange holding would be successful. This holding is, we believe, far too well
entrenched to be overruled.
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Nineteen years later, in United States v. Sanges,109 the Su-
preme Court rejected the suggestion that the government had a
common law right to appeal an unfavorable judgment. Absent
express statutory authority, the Court stated, the government
could not appeal an adverse final judgment, whether resulting
from a verdict of acquittal or from a pretrial ruling on a ques-
tion of law.110 While the Court implied that Congress could au-
thorize appeals by the government, it did not address the consti-
tutionally permissible scope of such legislation.
United States v. Ball"' involved the applicability of the
double jeopardy clause to reprosecution after an acquittal and to
retrial after appellate reversal of a conviction. The government
indicted Ball and two others for murder. The jury acquitted Mil-
lard F. Ball but found his codefendants (John C. Ball and Rob-
ert E. Boutwell) guilty, and the trial judge entered judgment on
the verdicts. The Supreme Court, on a writ of error, reversed the
convictions because the indictments were fatally defective. 2 On
remand, the trial court dismissed the indictments, and the grand
jury reindicted all three defendants for murder. After the judge
denied Millard F. Ball's plea of former acquittal and codefend-
ants' plea of former conviction, the jury returned verdicts of
guilty on all three. The Supreme Court, per Justice Gray, re-
versed Millard F. Ball's conviction but upheld the other two
convictions. Addressing himself first to Millard F. Ball's re-
indictment, he rejected the "English rule" that defective indict-
ments could not legally place an individual in jeopardy.1 Jus-
tice Gray reasoned that the rule would unfairly grant a
prosecutor a second opportunity to convict whenever he could
discover a defect in the original indictment. The Court held that
a verdict of acquittal on the general issue of guilt on an indict-
ment whose defect is not objected to before verdict bars a sec-
ond indictment for the same offense. Justice Gray distinguished
between a void judgment of acquittal before a court lacking ju-
109. 144 U.S. 310 (1892).
110. Id. at 318. The government had sued on a writ of error after the trial judge
sustained the defendant's demurrer and quashed the indictment. Strictly construed,
Sanges proscribed only review by writ of error, but the rationale applies equally to re-
view by appeal. Under current law, the United States is authorized to appeal from a
district court's dismissal of an indictment except where the double jeopardy clause for-
bids further prosecution. 18 U.S.C. § 3731 (1982).
111. 163 U.S. 662 (1896).
112. Ball v. United States, 140 U.S. 118 (1891). The indictments failed to allege that
the victim died within a year and a day of the assault, an essential element of the crime.
113. See Vaux's Case, 76 Eng. Rep. 992 (Q.B. 1591). As previously indicated, it ap-
pears that the rule in this case continued to hold sway in 18th century England. See
supra text accompanying notes 55-56.
Double Jeopardy
Journal of Law Reform
risdiction, which did not bar reindictment, and a voidable judg-
ment on a defective indictment, which could be challenged by
defendant but not by the government. In dictum, Justice Gray
stated that Sanges supported this proposition: "The verdict of
acquittal was final, and could not be reviewed, on error or other-
wise, without putting [the defendant] twice in jeopardy, and
thereby violating the Constitution.' ' 1 4 Justice Gray upheld,
however, the convictions of John C. Ball and Robert E. Bout-
well, "because it is quite clear that a defendant, who procures a
judgment against him upon an indictment to be set aside, may
be tried anew upon the same indictment, or upon another in-
dictment, for the same offense of which he has been
convicted.""'
2. The Kepner Decision's Rejection of "Continuing
Jeopardy"
The Supreme Court squarely addressed the double jeopardy
status of federal acquittals in Kepner v. United States."' Sit-
ting without a jury, a trial/judge found Kepner, a Filipino attor-
ney, not guilty of embezzlement. Consistent with local custom,
the government appealed to the Philippine Supreme Court,
which reversed Kepner's acquittal, found him guilty, and sen-
tenced him to prison. Kepner appealed to the United States Su-
preme Court, arguing that a double jeopardy provision in the
Philippines' organic law extended fifth amendment protection to
the Islands. A five to four majority of the Court agreed with
Kepner's interpretation of the organic law. The majority
adopted Justice Gray's Ball dictum as conclusive and held that
the government could not appeal from an acquittal. 1 7 In dis-
sent, Justice Holmes formulated the "continuing jeopardy" con-
cept: "[I]t seems to me that logically and rationally a man can-
not be said to be more than once in jeopardy in the same cause,
however often he may be tried. The jeopardy is one continuing
114. 163 U.S. at 669.
115. Id. at 672 (citations omitted).
116. 195 U.S. 100 (1904).
117. Analyzing the majority's opinion, one commentator stated that "the Court ap-
parently equated appeal with reprosecution within the constitutional prohibition. Either
the Court believed that reversal on appeal results in a constitutionally proscribed retrial
or that the appeal itself violates the constitutional ban, because both represent a threat
to the defendant's freedom." Comment, Double Jeopardy and Government Appeals of
Criminal Dismissals, 52 Tax. L. REV. 303, 314 (1974).
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jeopardy from its beginning to the end of the cause."11 8 Holmes
asserted that a rule prohibiting appeals was inconsistent with
existing precedents allowing retrial after hung juries and after
appellate reversals of convictions. While Holmes specified that
his analysis applied only to government appeals from errors of
law,'1 9 it has been pointed out that the "continuing jeopardy"
concept justifies appellate review of factfinding as well.
20
3. Twentieth Century Rejections of Appeals of Acquittals
Over half a century later, the Supreme Court held that even
an "implicit acquittal" entitled a defendant to protection from
double jeopardy in Green v. United States.'2' The defendant in
Green was charged with first degree murder. The judge in-
structed the jury that it could find the defendant guilty of either
first or second degree murder, and the jury convicted the de-
fendant of the lesser offense. The conviction was overturned on
appeal and the defendant was awarded a new trial. The defend-
ant was charged with and convicted of first degree murder at the
second trial. The defendant objected to the first degree charge
on double jeopardy grounds, and the Supreme Court upheld this
claim. The Court held that, although the first jury had not re-
turned an express verdict of acquittal as to the first degree
charge, the jury's conviction of the lesser offense constituted an
implied acquittal of the greater charge. Adhering to the premise
that verdicts of acquittal are final, the Court concluded that the
implicit acquittal absolutely barred a second trial for first degree
murder, thereby treating the implicit acquittal as if it had been
an express verdict.
The Supreme Court next squarely dealt with appellate review
of an acquittal in 1962. In Fong Foo v. United States, 2 the trial
judge determined during testimony at trial that the prosecutor
had refreshed the memory of an important witness. Citing this
"prosecutorial misconduct" and the "lack of credibility" of two
other government witnesses, the judge directed the jury to ac-
quit. The court of appeals issued a writ of mandamus ordering
the trial judge to vacate the acquittal and reassign the case for
trial. The Supreme Court reversed, per curiam. Relying on the
118. 195 U.S. at 134.
119. Id. at 135.
120. See Comment, supra note 117, at 315.
121. 355 U.S. 184, 190-91 (1957).
122. 369 U.S. 141 (1962) (per curiam).
Double Jeopardy
Journal of Law Reform
Ball dictum, the Court held that a final judgment of acquittal by
a court with jurisdiction in a trial on a valid indictment is unre-
viewable. In doing so, the Court distinguished an acquittal from
a prejudgment termination such as a mistrial. 23 Justice Clark
dissented. He objected to the majority's reliance on a midtrial
acquittal as grounds for automatically precluding retrial. Rea-
soning that the retrial issue should be a policy decision, Justice
Clark stated that "[tihe word 'acquittal' . . . is no magic open
sesame."
1 24
The Supreme Court's 1969 decision in Benton v. Maryland 12
affects the double jeopardy status of all state criminal proceed-
ings (including appeals of acquittals). In Benton, the Court held
that the double jeopardy clause applies fully to the states. Ben-
ton was convicted of burglary and acquitted of larceny in a
Maryland trial court and he appealed. Defendant's case was re-
manded to the trial court by the Maryland Court of Appeals for
reindictment and new trial. On retrial, Benton was convicted of
both burglary and larceny and he appealed. The Maryland
Court of Special Appeals affirmed the conviction, and the Su-
preme Court granted certiorari. The Court, per Justice Marshall,
held that Benton's retrial on the larceny count after an initial
acquittal violated the double jeopardy clause. In so holding, the
Court overruled Palko v. Connecticut,126 which had held that
federal double jeopardy standards were not applicable against
the states. The Court found "that the double jeopardy prohibi-
tion of the fifth amendment represents a fundamental ideal in
our constitutional heritage, and that it should apply to the states
through the Fourteenth Amendment.
127
Seven years after Benton, in United States v. Morrison,28 the
Court made it clear that the prohibition against government ap-
peals of acquittals also applied to bench trials, in which a judge
rather than a jury acts as the trier of fact. The Court stated that
123. Id. at 143. The distinction between mistrial and acquittal has been criticized on
the ground that an improper mistrial has the same harmful effect on the accused's inter-
est in being absolved as an erroneously declared acquittal. See Note, Double Jeopardy:
The Reprosecution Problem, 77 HARv. L. REv. 1272, 1286 (1964). One commentator has
belittled this criticism, stating that it "overlooks a functional justification for distin-
guishing the two: an acquittal not only connotes finality, but also signifies a decision on
the merits, even if erroneous. Mistrial, by contrast, contemplates another trial and pro-
vides a valuable tool for just and effective criminal administration." Comment, supra
note 117, at 316 n.71.
124. 369 U.S. at 144 (Clark, J., dissenting).
125. 395 U.S. 784 (1969).
126. 302 U.S. 319 (1937).
127. 395 U.S. at 794.
128. 429 U.S. 1, 3 (1976).
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"[s]ince the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment
nowhere distinguishes between bench and jury trials, the princi-
ples given expression through that clause apply to cases tried to
a judge.M
2 9
One year later, in United States v. Martin Linen Supply
Co.,130 the Supreme Court held that the double jeopardy clause
bars an appeal by the government from a trial judge's judgment
of acquittal after a deadlocked jury is discharged. The Court
reasoned that the "controlling constitutional principle" of the
double jeopardy clause is the prohibition against multiple trials.
The Court stated that "where a government appeal presents no
threat of successive prosecutions, the Double Jeopardy Clause is
not offended. '"11 In Martin Linen Supply, a second prosecution
would have been required had the government's appeal been
successful; accordingly, the government appeal was barred.
Shortly thereafter, in Sanabria v. United States,1 2 the Su-
preme Court addressed the status of pre-verdict acquittals that
are issued as a matter of law. In Sanabria the trial judge acquit-
ted the defendant after trial had commenced but before a final
verdict was rendered. The judge based his ruling on a clearly
erroneous interpretation of the statute in question133 and on the
insufficiency of evidence created by his erroneous exclusion (at
the defendant's request) of certain prosecutorial evidence.""
The government appealed on the ground that the judgment of
acquittal, though unreviewable as to one basis of liability, was
reviewable as to a second, discrete basis of liability. The court of
appeals agreed, and remanded for a new trial of the purportedly
reviewable charge. The Supreme Court, per Justice Marshall, re-
versed. The Court first rejected the theory that the single-count
indictment contained two discrete bases of liability, then stated
flatly that "there is no exception permitting retrial once the de-
fendant has been acquitted, no matter how 'egregiously errone-
ous' . . . the legal rulings leading to that judgment might be."13 5
In a brief one paragraph dissent, Justice Blackmun, joined by
Justice Rehnquist, stated that "there is misdescription by the
trial court of its order, and, [therefore], . . . the defendant peti-
tioner's maneuvers [defendant's successful motion to exclude
129. Id. at 3.
130. 430 U.S. 564 (1977).
131. Id. at 569-70.
132. 437 U.S. 54 (1978).
133. 18 U.S.C. § 1955 (1976) (a federal anti-gambling statute).
134. 437 U.S. at 59, 68.
135. Id. at 75 (citations omitted).
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certain prosecutorial evidence] should result in a surrender of
his right to receive a verdict by the jury that had been
drawn."'
3 6
4. Sufficiency of the Evidence and Acquittals
Unlike acquittals at the trial court level, appellate court rul-
ings that are tantamount to acquittals do not invariably bar re-
trials. From United States v. Ba11137 to Burks v. United
States'1 8 it appeared to be "[a]n established principle of [fed-
eral] criminal procedure. . . that a defendant can be retried for
an offense when his prior conviction for that offense has been set
aside on appeal." 3 9 In Burks, however, the Court held that
when an appellate court reverses a conviction on the grounds of
insufficient evidence at trial, a defendant cannot be retried. A
jury convicted Burks of using a dangerous weapon while com-
mitting a bank robbery. His principal defense was insanity. The
trial court denied defendant's motions for acquittal and new
trial, and he appealed from these denials. The appeals court
agreed with Burks that the government's evidence was insuffi-
cient as a matter of law to refute the insanity plea, and re-
manded to the district court for a determination of whether a
directed verdict of acquittal should be entered or a new trial or-
dered.14 0 The Supreme Court granted certiorari and ruled that
the double jeopardy clause barred further prosecution of the de-
fendant. The Court stated:
Since we necessarily afford absolute finality to a jury's
verdict of acquittal-no matter how erroneous its deci-
sion-it is difficult to conceive how society has any
greater interest in retrying a defendant when, on review,
it is decided as a matter of law that the jury could not
properly have returned a verdict of guilty.
14 1
136. Id. at 80-81 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
137. 163 U.S. 662 (1896).
138. 437 U.S. 1 (1978).
139. Noonan, Criminal Procedure III: Double Jeopardy, 1985 ANN. SUR. AM. L. 309,
310 (citation omitted). Prior to Burks, federal courts had held that a defendant "waived"
his double jeopardy right by requesting a new trial on appeal. See Yates v. United
States, 354 U.S. 298 (1957); Bryan v. United States, 338 U.S. 552 (1950).
140. United States v. Burks, 547 F.2d 968, 970 (6th Cir. 1976).
141. 437 U.S. at 16.
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Four years later, in Tibbs v. Florida,4" the Supreme Court
narrowed the Burks exception by distinguishing between rever-
sals due to insufficient evidence and reversals due to the weight
of the evidence. In Tibbs the Florida Supreme Court reversed
defendant's murder and rape convictions at a jury trial, citing its
disagreement with the weight accorded the evidence by the jury.
The trial court denied the state's motion for a retrial on double
jeopardy grounds. On appeal, the Florida Supreme Court re-
versed, granting the state's motion. The United States Supreme
Court affirmed the Florida Supreme Court's ruling. The Court
pointed out that a reversal due to insufficient evidence means a
rational factfinder could not convict the defendant when viewing
the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution. "' In
contrast, a reversal due to the weight of the evidence is appro-
priate when a reviewing court finds that, although the evidence
was sufficient to submit the question to the jury, it disagrees
with the jury's resolution of conflicting evidence. " "' The Court
ruled that the defendant could only be retried in the latter situ-
ation." 5 Justice White's dissent (joined by Justices Brennan,
Marshall, and Blackmun) expressed concern that some defend-
ants who merited acquittal at trial would be retried because re-
viewing judges who actually doubted the sufficiency of the evi-
dence might base reversal on the weight of the evidence.
The -Supreme Court further limited Burks in Justices of Bos-
ton Municipal Court v. Lydon,"' upholding Massachusetts' two-
tier trial system that permits a defendant to be retried without
appellate review of the sufficiency of the evidence at his first-tier
trial. A criminal defendant can choose a jury or a bench trial
under Massachusetts law." 7 A defendant can appeal a jury con-
viction but not a bench trial conviction; he may, however, peti-
tion for trial de novo in the latter case. Lydon was convicted of
possessing tools for breaking into automobiles at a bench trial.
He then requested trial de novo, but before it began, he moved
for dismissal of the trial judge's decision on the ground of evi-
dentiary insufficiency. The motion was denied, and the Supreme
Judicial Court of Massachusetts rejected Lydon's appeal, rea-
soning that a defendant is not placed in double jeopardy when
trial de novo is the only relief available from a conviction alleg-
142. 457 U.S. 31 (1982).
143. Id. at 40-41.
144. Id. at 42-43.
145. Id. at 42-43.
146. 466 U.S. 294 (1984).
147. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 218, §§ 26, 27A (West 1984).
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edly based on insufficient evidence. Lydon then petitioned for a
writ of habeas corpus, and the district court held that Burks
conferred on the defendant the constitutional right not to be re-
tried if the evidence was insufficient at his first trial.1 48 The
court of appeals affirmed."1 9
The Supreme Court reversed.""0 Writing for the Court, Justice
White relied on Holmes' "continuing jeopardy" concept (set
forth in Kepner). According to the Court, "continuing jeopardy"
underlies the general rule allowing retrial after an appellate re-
versal. The two-tier system can be regarded as "a single, contin-
uous course of judicial proceedings" terminated neither by Ly-
don's first-tier conviction nor by his claim of evidentiary
insufficiency. 1 In Burks, the Court merely held that appellate
reversals due to insufficient evidence are the equivalent of trial
level acquittals and thus terminate the initial jeopardy. Burks
did not determine whether a defendant who alleged evidentiary
insufficiency has the right to appellate review, before retrial, of
the evidence at his first trial. Justice White concluded that the
right to trial de novo gives "a defendant more-rather than
less-of the process normally extended to defendants in this na-
tion."152 Accordingly, the Massachusetts system passed constitu-
tional muster; it provided benefits to the defendant without al-
lowing "governmental oppression of the sort against which the
Double Jeopardy Clause was intended to protect.""I Justice
Brennan, joined by Justice Marshall, concurred in the judgment
but rejected the majority's reliance on the notion of continuing
jeopardy. Justice Brennan viewed "continuing jeopardy" as little
more than a label that had never been accepted by a majority of
the Court.'"
148. Lydon v. Justices of Boston Municipal Court, 536 F. Supp. 647 (1982). The dis-
trict court granted the writ, concluding that Lydon was "in custody" and had exhausted
state remedies. The court relied on the Supreme Court's 1969 holding that the double
jeopardy clause is fully enforceable against the states through the fourteenth amend-
ment. See Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784 (1969), discussed supra in the text accom-
panying notes 125-27.
149. Lydon v. Justices of Boston Municipal Court, 698 F.2d 1 (1982).
150. In reversing, the Court relied heavily on its decision in Ludwig v. Massachusetts,
427 U.S. 618 (1976), which upheld from double jeopardy attack an earlier version of
Massachusetts' two-tier system. In Lydon, the Court stressed that the two-tier system
merely allows a convicted defendant a second chance at acquittal on the facts. 466 U.S.
at 310-12 (citing Ludwig, 427 U.S. at 632).
151. Id. at 308-09.
152. Id. at 305-06, 309.
153. Id. at 310 (quoting United States v. Scott, 437 U.S. 82, 91 (1978)).
154. Id. at 315-19 (Brennan, J. concurring in the judgment).
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The Supreme Court further underscored the limited scope of
the Burks holding in Richardson v. United States.15 5 Richard-
son had been tried for three narcotics violations. The jury ac-
quitted him of one count and failed to return a unanimous ver-
dict on the remaining two. A mistrial was declared as to the
latter two counts. The trial court denied Richardson's motion
for acquittal based on evidentiary insufficiency and scheduled a
retrial. Richardson argued on appeal that Burks and Abney v.
United States15' entitled him to interlocutory review of the evi-
dence at his first trial. The Supreme Court disagreed. Justice
Rehnquist's majority opinion stressed that the double jeopardy
clause's protections are relevant only when there has been an
event terminating the original jeopardy. Retrial following a hung
jury does not violate the double jeopardy clause,"' given "soci-
ety's interest in giving the prosecution one complete opportunity
to convict those who have violated its laws."158 The Court con-
cluded that a different rule would interfere with the administra-
tion of justice."5' In dissent, Justice Brennan reasoned that,
under Burks, the defendant had the right to appellate review of
his evidentiary insufficiency claim prior to a new trial. Justice
Brennan argued that the majority's approach contravened the
double jeopardy principle of allowing the state only one fair op-
portunity to prove its case. He emphasized that under the
Court's holding a defendant constitutionally entitled to an ac-
quittal at trial who is not acquitted cannot avoid retrial. Never-
theless, a defendant who is tried before a judge or jury that de-
mands sufficient evidence or a defendant who was acquitted due
to mistakes of fact or law will not be retried."60 Justice Brennan
deemed such diverse outcomes logically inconsistent.
Very recently, in Smalis v. Pennsylvania,"" a unanimous
Court ruled that a trial judge's granting of a demurrer based on
insufficiency of the evidence constitutes a non-appealable ac-
quittal for double jeopardy purposes. Petitioners were charged
with various crimes in connection with a fire in a building they
owned that killed two tenants. Following the close of the prose-
155. 468 U.S. 317 (1984).
156. 431 U.S. 651 (1977). The Court in Abney held that the special nature of the
double jeopardy right placed a pretrial order denying defendant's double jeopardy claim
within the "collateral order" exception to the final judgment rule, rendering the order
appealable.
157. United States v. Perez, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 579 (1824).
158. 468 U.S. at 324 (quoting Arizona v. Washington, 434 U.S. 497, 509 (1978)).
159. Id. at 324-26 (quoting Wade v. Hunter, 336 U.S. 684, 688-89 (1949)).
160. Id. at 327 (Brennan, J. dissenting).
161. 476 U.S. 140 (1986).
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cution's case in chief at their Pennsylvania state court bench
trial, petitioners filed a demurrer challenging the sufficiency of
the evidence. The trial court sustained the demurrer, and the
Pennsylvania Superior Court quashed the state's appeal on the
ground that it was barred by the double jeopardy clause. The
Pennsylvania Supreme Court reversed, holding that the granting
of a demurrer is not the functional equivalent of an acquittal
and that, for double jeopardy purposes, a defendant who demurs
at the close of the prosecution's case in chief "elects to seek dis-
missal on grounds unrelated to his factual guilt or innocence."
The Supreme Court granted certiorari and reversed. Citing
Sanabria, Justice White's opinion stated that "a ruling that as a
matter of law the State's evidence is insufficient to establish his
factual guilt . . is an acquittal under the Double Jeopardy
Clause.' 162 Justice White rejected Pennsylvania's argument,
based on Lydon, that resumption of petitioners' bench trial fol-
lowing a reversal on appeal would merely constitute "continuing
jeopardy." According to Justice White, "Lydon teaches that
'[a]cquittals, unlike convictions, terminate the initial jeopardy.'
... .Thus, whether the trial is to a jury or to the bench, sub-
jecting the defendant to postacquittal factfinding proceedings
going to guilt or innocence violates the Double Jeopardy
Clause."'163 In short, "[w]hen a successful postacquittal appeal
by the prosecution would lead to proceedings that violate the
Double Jeopardy Clause, the appeal itself has no proper pur-
pose. Allowing such an appeal would frustrate the interest of the
accused in having an end to the proceedings against him."' 64
5. Appealable Discharges Not Constituting "Acquittals"
Pretrial discharges have been held not to pose the double
jeopardy obstacles presented by acquittals. In Serfass v. United
States,'"66 the Supreme Court pointed out that a pretrial dismis-
sal occurs prior to the time when jeopardy attaches, and held,
therefore, that a defendant is not exposed to double jeopardy if
the government appeals and subsequently resumes prosecution.
In Serfass, an indictment for draft evasion was dismissed upon
the defendant's pretrial motion alleging that he had been denied
162. Id. at 144.
163. Id. at 145.
164. Id.
165. 420 U.S. 377 (1975)
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full consideration of his conscientious objector status. The court
of appeals rejected defendant's double jeopardy objections to the
government's appeal of the dismissal, and the Supreme Court
affirmed. The Court ruled that "[w]ithout risk of a determina-
tion of guilt, jeopardy does not attach, and neither an appeal nor
further prosecution constitutes double jeopardy."'66
Double jeopardy likewise does not bar government appeal of a
judge's posttrial discharge following conviction by the trier of
fact.1 67 According to the Supreme Court in United States v.
Wilson, " this follows from the fact that a successful govern-
ment appeal of a post-conviction judgment would allow rein-
statement of the guilty verdict without threat of actual rep-
rosecution. A jury found Wilson guilty of unlawful conversion of
union funds, but the trial judge granted defendant's post-verdict
motion to dismiss on grounds of pre-indictment delay. The court
of appeals rejected the government's appeal on double jeopardy
grounds, deeming the dismissal an unreviewable acquittal. The
Supreme Court reversed, noting that a new trial was not re-
quired for reinstatement of the guilty verdict. The Court stated
that "a defendant has no legitimate claim to benefit from an er-
ror of law when that error could be corrected without subjecting
him to a second trial before a second trier of fact."'"
The Supreme Court applied the principle laid down in Wilson
to bench trials in United States v. Jenkins.17 0 Following a bench
trial, the trial judge dismissed Jenkins' indictment for failing to
report for induction into the armed services. The judge reasoned
that it would be unfair to apply retroactively a Supreme Court
ruling that local draft boards need not consider post-induction-
order claims for conscientious objector status. The Second Cir-
cuit dismissed the government's appeal for lack of jurisdiction
under the Criminal Appeals Act;171 the court of appeals believed
that Jenkins had been acquitted and that appeal was barred re-
gardless of the need for a second trial.
72
The Supreme Court affirmed, but on grounds different from
those relied upon by the Second Circuit. According to Justice
Rehnquist, Wilson held that "[wihen a case has been tried to a
166. Id. at 391-92.
167. Such posttrial discharges in federal court are authorized by FED. R. CraM. P.
29(c).
168. 420 U.S. 332 (1975).
169. Id. at 345.
170. 420 U.S. 358 (1975).
171. 18 U.S.C. § 3731 (1970).
172. United States v. Jenkins, 490 F.2d 868, 880 (2d Cir. 1973).
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iury, the Double Jeopardy Clause does not prohibit an appeal by
the Government providing that a retrial would not be required
in the event the Government is successful in its appeal. 17' That
principle applied in the instant case, since the double jeopardy
clause does not distinguish between bench and jury trials. Be-
cause the Court could not discover a clear resolution of the fac-
tual issues against Jenkins in the trial court, the dismissal of the
government's appeal was allowed to stand. The Court noted
that, with no finding of guilt to reinstate, remand to the trial
court for additional findings would have been required if the
government's appeal succeeded. The Court concluded that such
a remand would be inappropriate: "The trial, which could have
resulted in a judgment of conviction, has long since terminated
in [Jenkins'] favor. To subject him to any further such proceed-
ings at this stage would further violate the Double Jeopardy
"1174Clause ... .
The Supreme Court also has held that a midtrial dismissal se-
cured by defendant on grounds unrelated to guilt or innocence
does not create a double jeopardy bar to government appeals in
United States v. Scott. 75 After hearing all of the evidence and
before submitting the case to the jury, the trial judge granted
Scott's motion to dismiss the first two counts of a three count
indictment for distribution of narcotics. The judge ruled that
Scott had been prejudiced by pre-indictment delay. Thereafter
the jury rendered a verdict of not guilty as to the third count.
The court of appeals denied the government's appeal of the two
trial court dismissals. The Supreme Court reversed the court of
appeals and remanded to that court for consideration of the
merits of the government's appeal."' The Court pointed out
that Scott could have awaited verdict, and, in the event he was
found guilty, entered a post-verdict motion for dismissal.1 7 7 In-
stead, Scott elected to seek early termination of his trial on
grounds unrelated to his guilt or innocence. His motion pre-
vented the government from securing a determination of guilt or
173. 420 U.S. at 365.
174. Id. at 370. Jenkins was subsequently rejected by the Court in United States v.
Scott, 437 U.S. 82 (1978), to the extent that it barred every reversal of a mid-trial dis-
missal that would lead to the resolution of factual issues on remand. See infra note 176.
175. 437 U.S. 82 (1978).
176. In doing so the Court (by a five to four majority) overruled its holding in United
States v. Jenkins, 420 U.S. 358 (1975), that any mid-trial discharge of a defendant would
bar further proceedings if a resolution of factual issues would be required on reversal and
remand.
177. If such a motion had been granted, the government could have appealed. See
discussion of Wilson, supra text accompanying notes 167-69.
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innocence by the jury empaneled to try him. 178 Accordingly,
Scott had no double jeopardy right to avoid a second trial. As
one commentator has noted, Scott indicates that dismissals
based on legal grounds-which do not implicate factual guilt or
innocence-are to be treated differently than dismissals based
on factual grounds.17 9 The latter dismissals are barred from re-
consideration on double jeopardy grounds, while the former are
not. Justice Brennan's dissenting opinion, joined by three other
Justices, rejected this "fact/law" distinction as "insupportable in
either logic or policy."
s
The "fact/law" distinction set forth in Scott was discussed
most recently in Rodrigues v. Hawaii.'81 Rodrigues was indicted
on several counts of sodomy and rape. Prior to the empanelling
of a jury, Rodrigues' attorney raised the defense of mental dis-
ease. The trial judge suspended the preliminary proceedings,
and, after a ten day hearing on the insanity issue, entered an
acquittal on grounds of insanity. The state appealed, and the
Supreme Court of Hawaii, in a divided opinion, reversed and re-
manded on the ground that the trial court erred in weighing the
evidence as to insanity. The Supreme Court denied certiorari,
and Justice Brennan, joined by Justice Marshall, dissented. The
dissent noted that the trial judge concededly had sat as a "trier
of fact" on the insanity issue. As Justice Brennan pointed out,
[tihe issue in the instant case-an issue neither discussed
nor addressed in Serfass-is whether jeopardy attaches
to an acquittal based upon a resolution of a factual ele-
ment of the crime that occurred prior to the empanelling
of a jury or the calling of the first witness. . . . Because
we have not addressed the question and because it is of
some importance, I believe that plenary consideration is
appropriate."18
Appeals of sentences, unlike appeals of acquittals, are not
barred by the double jeopardy clause. In United States v.
DiFrancesco,'s3 the Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality
of 18 U.S.C. § 3576, which allows the United States to appeal to
the court of appeals the sentence given a "dangerous special of-
178. See 437 U.S. at 96-99.
179. See Note, Double Jeopardy: When is an Acquittal an Acquittal?, 20 B.C.L. REv.
925, 939-940 (1979).
180. 437 U.S. at 103 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
181. 469 U.S. 1078 (1984) (dissent from denial of certiorari).
182. Id.
183. 449 U.S. 117 (1980).
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fender" by a district court, and allows the court of appeals to
affirm the sentence, impose a different sentence, or remand to
the district court for further sentencing proceedings. The Court
deemed it well established that a sentence in a non-capital case
"does not have the qualities of constitutional finality that attend
an acquittal."'" The Court emphasized that "the prosecution's
statutorily granted right to review a sentence . . . does not in-
volve a retrial or approximate the ordeal of a trial on the basic
issue of guilt or innocence.'185
Before closing this discussion, a brief comment concerning the
"attachment" of jeopardy is in order. As previously noted, s6
under English law an individual is not considered "in jeopardy"
until a verdict of acquittal or conviction is entered. In contrast,
under American case law, jeopardy is said to attach in a jury
trial when the jury is empaneled and sworn.18 7 In a bench trial,
attachment occurs when the judge begins to hear the* evi-
dence.s As Justice Powell's dissent in Crist v. Betz points out,
the rule that jeopardy attaches when a jury has been empaneled
and sworn appears to confuse a common law rule of jury practice
with the concept of double jeopardy. 8 9 Justice Powell marshals
evidence suggesting that in the early nineteenth century, the
double jeopardy clause was not deemed to bar retrials of individ-
uals in cases in which a jury had been dismissed prior to render-
ing a verdict. According to Justice Powell, it was understood
during that period that jeopardy attached at the time of convic-
tion or acquittal and not before.' 90
Nevertheless, the question of when jeopardy attaches has no
direct bearing on the central issue addressed by this Re-
port-the appealability of acquittals. Whether or not jeopardy
184. Id. at 134.
185. Id. at 136.
186. See supra text accompanying notes 33-34.
187. See Crist v. Betz, 437 U.S. 28, 35-36 (1978); Downum v. United States, 372 U.S.
734, 735-38 (1963).
188. See United States v. Martin Linen Supply Co., 430 U.S. 564, 569 (1977).
189. See 437 U.S. at 43-46.
190. See id. at 44. Justice Powell notes that Justices Washington and Story originally
believed that jeopardy attached at the time of conviction or acquittal. See United States
v. Coolidge, 25 F. Cas. 622 (C.C.D. Mass. 1815) (No. 14,858) (Story, J.); United States v.
Haskell, 26 F. Cas. 207, 212 (C.C.D. Pa. 1823) (No. 15,321) (Washington, J.) ("the jeop-
ardy spoken of in [the fifth amendment] can be interpreted to mean nothing short of the
acquittal or conviction of the prisoner, and the judgment of the court thereupon.") As
late as 1833, Justice Story opined that the double jeopardy clause meant "that a party
shall not be tried a second time for the same offense, after he has once been convicted, or
acquitted of the offense charged, by the verdict of a jury, and judgment has passed
thereon for or against him." 3 J. STORY, supra note 93, at 659.
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attaches at an earlier stage, it is clear, at the very least, that
jeopardy has attached by the time an acquittal is entered. There
is no eighteenth century evidence, nor evidence in contemporary
English practice to suggest that jeopardy does not attach until
after the government has appealed an acquittal. Thus, even if
American case law were to revert to eighteenth century norms
and hold that jeopardy attaches at the time of conviction or ac-
quittal, the government's right to appeal an acquittal could not
justifiably be expanded. In any event, despite the technical rules
of attachment, the preceding case law discussion reveals that the
courts have seen fit to allow government appeals in a variety of
situations after evidence has begun to be heard or a jury has
been empaneled. For these reasons, this Report does not concern
itself further with the "attachment of jeopardy" question.
B. Summary Of Case Law Principles
The preceding case law discussion illuminates double jeopardy
obstacles to federal government appeals of judicial terminations
that favor defendants. Under current case law, it is well estab-
lished that terminations deemed "acquittals" cannot be ap-
pealed by the government (Kepner). This rule, which is aimed at
forestalling successive prosecutions, applies to implied acquittals
(Green); to acquittals by the judge as trier of fact (Morrison);
and to a trial judge's judgment of acquittal in the face of a dead-
locked jury (Martin Linen Supply). The rule holds even when
an acquittal is due to trial court errors of law- (Sanabria).
Whether a trial is to the jury or to the bench, this rule protects
defendants from post-acquittal factfinding proceedings going to
guilt or innocence (Smalis).
Despite the flat rule barring appeals of acquittals, the govern-
ment retains substantial latitude to obtain new trials when the
jury is unable to reach a verdict at the initial trial or when con-
victions are set aside, and to appeal dismissals in criminal cases.
The double jeopardy clause does not bar a retrial following a
hung jury (Richardson), nor does it bar retrials following appel-
late court rulings that set aside convictions, provided those rul-
ings are not based on insufficiency of the evidence (Burks). Fur-
thermore, appellate court reversals of convictions based on
different interpretations of the weight accorded the evidence do
not bar retrials (Tibbs). Convicted defendants in "two-tier trial"
jurisdictions do not appear to have a double jeopardy right to
appeal, based on insufficiency of the evidence, as long as a trial
Double Jeopardy
Journal of Law Reform
de novo is available (Lydon). In addition, the double jeopardy
clause does not bar government appeals of pretrial discharges
(Serfass), midtrial dismissals on legal grounds unrelated to guilt
or innocence (Scott), or posttrial discharges following conviction
by the trier of fact (Wilson). Finally, there is no double jeopardy
bar to government appeals of sentences (DiFrancesco).
In sum, current judicial precedents allow the government to
appeal a wide variety of pretrial, midtrial, and posttrial determi-
nations providing for the release of criminal defendants. Only
acquittals by the trier of fact-whether explicit or im-
plicit-invoke the double jeopardy clause's prohibition on gov-
ernment appeals.
III. DOUBLE JEOPARDY TREATMENT OF GOVERNMENT APPEALS
OF ACQUITTALS IN OTHER JURISDICTIONS
We now briefly survey the double jeopardy treatment of gov-
ernment appeals of acquittals as it developed in the fifty states
and in foreign jurisdictions. Our discussion of state double jeop-
ardy law covers the period prior to 1969, when the Supreme
Court held in Benton v. Maryland9" that the federal Constitu-
tion's double jeopardy clause is fully enforceable against the
states through the fourteenth amendment. Since Benton, federal
constitutional restrictions on appeals of acquittals have applied
fully to the states.
A. The Treatment Of Government Appeals Of Acquittals In
The Fifty States"e2
The adoption of the federal double jeopardy clause inspired
various states to adopt state constitutional double jeopardy pro-
visions. Pennsylvania adopted a double jeopardy clause in 1790,
followed by Kentucky and Delaware in 1792. Large numbers of
states followed suit in the nineteenth century. By the time of
Benton v. Maryland, forty-five of the fifty state constitutions
contained double jeopardy clauses. 19 3 Thirty-seven state consti-
191. 395 U.S. 784 (1969).
192. The discussion of the double jeopardy status of appeals in the 50 states draws
upon our independent research into early American case law. A good overview of the
state law treatment of double jeopardy is found in J. SIGLER, supra note 20, at 77-115.
193. Id. at 78-79. Maryland, Connecticut, Massachusetts, North Carolina, and Ver-
mont were the only five states whose constitutions contained no double jeopardy clause.
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tutions largely followed the federal formula that no person shall
be twice put in "jeopardy," while eight constitutions provided
that after an acquittal a person shall not be tried again for the
same offense (the New Hampshire formula). No state constitu-
tion, however, indicated (and none indicates today) what is
meant by "jeopardy" or by "the same offense." Furthermore, no
state constitution addressed (or today addresses) the status of
government appeals of acquittals.
Early- and mid-nineteenth century state cases indicate a
widely held understanding that, at common law, the state could
not bring a writ of error following an acquittal. In 1817, the Su-
preme Court of Tennessee, in dismissing an appeal by the state
after an acquittal of perjury, stated that "[a] writ of error, or
appeal in the nature of a writ of error, will not lie for the State
in such a case. It is a rule of the common law that no one shall
be brought into jeopardy for one and the same offense.. .. Be-
cause of this rule it is that a new trial cannot be granted in a
criminal case, where the defendant is acquitted. A writ of error
will lie for the defendant, but not against him. ' In 1820, the
General Court of Virginia dismissed a writ of error filed by the
Commonwealth's attorney to reverse a judgment for defendant
on demurrer to an information for unlawful gaming. The Court
simply stated that "no writ of error lies in a criminal case for the
Commonwealth. '"I" In 1836, the Illinois Supreme Court sum-
marily dismissed a writ of error sued out by the state to reverse
a judgment of acquittal upon exceptions taken at a trial by jury.
The court held that, under common law, a writ of error would
not lie on behalf of the people in a criminal case. ' " In 1848, the
New York State Court of Appeals dismissed the state's writ of
error following judgment for defendant on a demurrer to an in-
dictment for perjury. After consulting historical precedents, the
court concluded that "[t]he weight of authority seems to be
against the right of the government to bring error in a criminal
case."1 97 In 1849, the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts
ruled in companion cases that a writ of error did not lie in a
criminal case on behalf of the Commonwealth.198 In the same
Id. at 79, n. 6. The list of state constitutions lacking a double jeopardy clause has not
changed. SACHS, FUNDAMENTAL L=RTES AND RIGHTS: A 50-STATE INDEX 47, in CONsrrru-
TIONS OF THE UNITED STATES: NATIONAL AND STATE (1980) (updated periodically).
194. State v. Reynolds, 4 Haywood 110 (Tenn. 1817).
195. Commonwealth v. Harrison, 2 Va. Cas. 202 (1820) (emphasis in original).
196. People v. Dill, 1 Scam. Ill. Rep. 257 (1836).
197. People v. Corning, 2 N.Y. 9, 17 (1848).
198. Commonwealth v. Cummings and Same v. McGinnis, 3 Cush. 212 (Mass. 1849).
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year, the Supreme Court of Georgia dismissed a writ of error
sued out by the state upon a judgment quashing an indictment
against the defendant. The court concluded that "the rule seems
to be well settled in England, that in criminal cases a new trial is
not grantable to the Crown after verdict of acquittal, even
though the acquittal be founded on the misdirection of the
judge. This is the general rule, and obtains in the states of our
union."' 99 Similarly, decisions in Wisconsin and Florida held
that the state was not entitled to a writ of error to reverse a
judgment quashing an indictment, and discharging the
accused.00
Early case holdings in four jurisdictions-North Carolina,
Maryland, Pennsylvania, and Louisiana-accorded some recog-
nition to the state's right to file writs of error in criminal cases.
None of those holdings, however, clearly established the right of
the state to appeal an acquittal.
In State v. Haddock,'0 1 an individual who had been convicted
of stealing a bell moved for arrest of judgment on the ground
that the indictment did not set forth whose property the bell
was. The Pitt County Court arrested the judgment, and the
North Carolina Superior Court affirmed. In a very brief, rather
confusing one paragraph opinion, the Superior Court stated that
"an appeal will lie for the State where the defendant is acquit-
ted or otherwise discharged upon an indictment, as well as for
the defendant who is convicted. Though,. . . were this res in-
tegra, [1] should not be of that opinion upon the words of the
acts relative to appeals.'' 2 The court went on to affirm the ar-
rest of judgment on the ground that the indictment's failure to
specify the property's owner was "a matter of substance.' 03 Be-
cause this case involved an initial conviction, rather than an ac-
quittal, the court's statement that "an appeal will lie. . . when
the defendant is acquitted" should be read as dictum.20' Consis-
tent with this conclusion, the North Carolina Superior Court
199. State v. Jones, 7 Ga. 422, 424 (1849).
200. State v. Kemp, 17 Wis. 669 (1864); State v. Burns, 18 Fla. 185 (1881).
201. 2 Hayw. 162 (N.C. 1802).
202. Id.
203. Id.
204. The peculiar reference to "res integra" or "a single cause" may have reflected
the fact that the defendant originally was convicted of stealing the bell but simultane-
ously was acquitted of stealing a heifer. (Presumably these two alleged thefts involved
the same transaction and were tried together, though the brief Superior Court opinion
does not make this absolutely clear). If so, the court may have been suggesting that it
would not have entertained an appeal by the state of that acquittal.
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held in State v. Jones °5 that the state prosecutor could not ap-
peal Jones' acquittal of an unspecified crime. According to the
court, "[tihe state, in a criminal prosecution, is not entitled to
an appeal under any of the provisions of the act of Assembly
regulating appeals: this appeal, therefore, must be dismissed.""
In 1821, in State v. Buchanan,2 0 7 the Maryland Court of Ap-
peals sustained a writ of error by the state to reverse a judgment
in favor of defendants on demurrer to an indictment for conspir-
ing to occupy the premises of a bank building without the per-
mission of the building owners. In support of allowing the state's
appeal, the court cited a number of unreported cases handed
down in Maryland between 1793 and 1817. The court also noted
Lord Hale's statements (discussed above in this Report) to the
effect that the crown could bring a writ of error in the cases of:
(1) a defective indictment; or (2) conduct found by the jury to
have occurred that is incorrectly characterized by the court as
not being a felony. It must be recognized, nevertheless, that no
acquittal actually had been handed down in the Buchanan
case-rather, the trial court merely had granted a demurrer to
the indictment. Moreover, the Maryland Court of Appeals sub-
sequently changed its position and barred government appeals
of acquittals. In State v. Shields,2 0 8 that court denied the state's
motion for a new trial following defendant's acquittal of forgery,
despite an 1872 statute granting both the accused and the state
authority to tender bills of exceptions to trial court rulings in
criminal cases. The court concluded that "absent some clear and
definite expression of the legislative will to" the contrary, the
"settled rule of the common law," which prohibited retrial fol-
lowing an acquittal, would stand. '09 The statute under review in
Shields did not clearly displace the common law rule, the court
concluded.
In several early cases, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania en-
tertained writs of error by the prosecution in criminal cases.
None of these cases, however, involved appeals of aquittals. In
Commonwealth v. Taylor2 10 defendant was convicted of break-
ing and entering and thereby inducing a miscarriage by the ag-
grieved homeowner's wife. The trial court arrested judgment
upon the ground that the offense charged was not indictable,
205. 5 N.C. 257 (1809).
206. Id.
207. 5 H. & J. 317 (Md. 1821).
208. 49 Md. 301 (1878).
209. Id. at 303.
210. 5 Binn. 277 (Pa. 1812).
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and the state brought a writ of error. The Supreme Court enter-
tained the writ (without commenting upon its authority to do
so) and reversed the trial court's ruling, thereby allowing the
conviction to be reinstated. In Commonwealth v. McKisson
211
the trial court granted defendant's motion to quash an indict-
ment for fraudulently tricking a farmer out of his heifer, on the
ground "that the assertion of a falsehood which common pru-
dence could guard against is not indictable. 2 1 2 The state filed a
writ of error and the Supreme Court reinstated the indictment,
reasoning that the offense charged was indictable. Once again,
the Supreme Court did not seek to justify its decision to hear
the appeal. Similarly, in Commonwealth v. Church,1 3 the Penn-
sylvania Supreme Court entertained, without comment, prosecu-
tion's writ of error following the trial court's quashing of an in-
dictment for criminally damming a river. The Supreme Court
reinstated the indictment, ruling that the trial court had erred
in determining, as a preliminary matter, that the dam in ques-
tion was not covered by Pennsylvania's statute prohibiting the
erection of certain dams.
Two early Louisiana cases entertained state appeals from
quashed indictments. In State v. Jones, 4 the trial court
quashed defendant's indictment for assault with a dangerous
weapon, and the state appealed. The state prosecutor "admitted
that no appeal could be prosecuted by the State so as to affect a
verdict of acquittal.2125 The Louisiana Court of Errors and Ap-
peals reinstated the indictment, holding that a Louisiana statute
allowed the state to appeal quashed indictments. At the same
time, the court emphasized that according to the common law of
England and of most of the states-and the general opinion of
the bar-the state could not bring a writ of error in a criminal
case. Similarly, in State v. Ellis,21 the Louisiana Supreme Court
reinstated an indictment for assault with a dangerous weapon
that had been quashed before trial. The supreme court ruled
that the Louisiana Constitution authorized the state to file crim-
inal appeals "where the indictment has been quashed before a
trial, or held bad upon a demurrer. . . [, because] [i]f the pris-
oner has not been tried he has not been in jeopardy."2""
211. 8 Serg. & Rawle 420 (Pa. 1822).
212. Id. at 421.
213. 1 Pa. 105 (1845).
214. 8 Rob. 573 (La. 1845).
215. Id.
216. 12 La. Ann. 390 (1857).
217. Id. at 391.
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In sum, the few early state cases that authorized prosecutorial
appeals in criminal cases involved pre-verdict quashed indict-
ments, or trial court decisions to set aside guilty verdicts. None
of these cases evinces a historical understanding that the state
could appeal acquittals. Indeed, a number of these cases contain
strong language to the contrary.
Most states continued to view government appeals of acquit-
tals unfavorably throughout the nineteenth century. A 1935
American Law Institute (ALI) survey revealed that only in Con-
necticut (whose constitution contained no double jeopardy
clause) could the state "appeal from an acquittal of the defend-
ant for error on the trial; . . . [iln all of the other states the
state [wa]s not allowed a new trial after an acquittal for errors
prejudicial to the state upon the original trial." 18 According to
the ALI, state decisions disallowing government appeals were
"based, in some cases, on the fact that there is no common law
or statutory authority for such procedure, in others on the fact
that the constitution either prohibits a second trial for the same
offense after an acquittal, or provides that no person shall be
twice put in jeopardy for the same offense. 2 19 The ALl cited
Indiana, Iowa, Maryland, Mississippi, Nevada, North Carolina,
Tennessee, and Washington cases as illustrating appeal prohibi-
tions based on the theory that there was no statutory or com-
mon law authority for such procedure. 2 0 Michigan, Missouri,
Rhode Island, and Texas cases were given as examples of the
view that retrial was barred by state constitutional provisions
prohibiting an acquitted person from being tried again for the
same offense.221 Precedents from Arkansas, California, Illinois,
Kentucky, Mississippi, Washington, and West Virginia were of-
218. ALI, ADMINISTRATION OF THE CRIMINAL LAW: DOUBLE JEOPARDY 111 (Official
Draft 1935) (commentary to § 13) [hereinafter ALl: DOUBLE JEOPARDY]. As of 1935, the
only state statute authorizing the government to appeal an acquittal was CONN. GEN.
STAT. § 6494, which authorized the State of Connecticut to appeal "all questions of law
arising on the trial of criminal cases." ALI: DOUBLE JEOPARDY, supra, at 112.
Applying this statute, the Connecticut Supreme Court held in State v. Lee, 65 Conn.
265, 30 A. 1110 (1894), that where the defendant was indicted for murder and at trial the
court excluded evidence material to the state, the state could have a new trial following
defendant's acquittal. This decision viewed the government's appeal as the continuation
of "one single jeopardy."
219. ALl: DOUBLE JEOPARDY, supra note 218, at 111.
220. Id. at 114-115 (citing State v. Newkirk, 80 Ind. 131 (1881); State v. Johnson, 2
Iowa 549 (1856); State v. Shields, 49 Md. 301 (1878); State v. Anderson, 3 S. & M. 751
(Miss. 1844); State v. Hall, 3 Nev. 172 (1867); State v. Herrick, 3 Nev. 259 (1867); State
v. Credle, 63 N.C. 506 (1869); State v. Reynolds, 4 Hayw. 110 (N.C. 1817); State v. Solo-
mons, 6 Yer. 360 (Tenn. 1834); and State v. Hubbell, 18 Wash. 482, 51 P. 1039 (1898)).
221. Id. at 115 (citing People v. Swift, 59 Mich. 529 (1886); State v. Spear, 6 Mo. 644
(1840); State v. Lee, 10 R.I. 494 (1873); and State v. Burris, 3 Tex. 118 (1848)).
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fered as instances in which new trials were prohibited because of
stated constitutional provisions that no person shall be twice put
in jeopardy for the same offense. 22
The universally held (except in Connecticut) principle that
the state could not appeal an acquittal on grounds of error was
subject to two slight qualifications in a few jurisdictions. First, a
few cases in Arkansas, Kentucky, Mississippi, and North Caro-
lina held that an acquittal procured unfairly by the fraud or col-
lusion of the defendant constituted no bar to a second prosecu-
tion for the same offense.2  In contrast, an Indiana case held
that where fraud had been perpetrated through bribery of the
state's attorney by persons acting in the defendant's interest,
the acquittal obtained could not be collaterally attacked and was
a bar to a second prosecution for the same offense.2 4 Second,
courts in Arkansas and West Virginia upheld statutes that per-
mitted state appeals of acquittals in misdemeanor cases punish-
able by fine only, on the ground that such appeals did not in-
volve a threat to the defendant's life or limb.2 2 5
State law holdings that prohibited government appeals of ac-
quittals remained largely intact between 1935 (the year the ALl
surveyed state double jeopardy law) and 1969 (the year Benton
v. Maryland was handed down). One state, Wisconsin, emulated
Connecticut's example by enacting a statute that allowed the
state as well as the accused to appeal criminal judgments "upon
all questions of law."22 6 This law was upheld as consistent with
Wisconsin's constitution in 1943.27 No other state followed suit.
222. Id. at 115-116 (citing State v. Hand, 6 Ark. 169 (1845); People v. Webb, 38 Cal.
467 (1869); People v. Royal, 1 Scam. 557 (Ill. 1839); Commonwealth v. Ball, 126 Ky. 542
(1907) (appeal not allowed although clear error of fact produced acquittal); State v. An-
derson, 3 S. & M. 751, 753 (Miss. 1844); State v. Hubbell, 18 Wash. 482 (1898); and Ex
parte Bornee, 76 W. Va. 360, 85 S.E. 529 (1915) (appeal not allowed despite state's claim
that verdict of acquittal was contrary to the law and the evidence)).
223. Id. at 104 (citing State v. Ketchum, 113 Ark. 68, 167 S.W, 73 (1914) ("rigged"
initial prosecution instituted at defendant's behest and tried before defendant's cronies
deemed not to have constituted an initial jeopardy); McDermott v. Commonwealth, 30
Ky. L. Rptr. 1227 (1907); Price v. State, 104 Miss. 288, 61 So. 314 (1913); State v. Swep-
son, 79 N.C. 632 (1878)).
224. Id. at 105 (citing Shideler v. State, 129 Ind. 523, 28 N.E. 537 (1891)).
225. Taylor v. State, 36 Ark. 84 (1880); Jones v. State, 15 Ark. 261 (1854); Mounds-
vile v. Fountain, 27 W. Va. 182 (1885). In Ex parte Bornee, 76 W. Va. 360, 366 (1915),
the West Virginia Supreme Court clarified its Moundsville holding by stating that the
state could not constitutionally appeal the acquittal of any crime punishable by fine and
imprisonment-even a misdemeanor. The U.S. Supreme Court held that the federal
Constitution's double jeopardy clause applied to misdemeanors in Ex parte Lange, 85
U.S. (18 Wall.) 163 (1873).
226. 1941 Wis. Laws ch. 306, codified at Wis. STAT. § 358.12(8) (1941).
227. State v. Witte, 243 Wis. 423, 10 N.W. 2d 117 (1943).
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In sum, prior to the incorporation of the double jeopardy
clause, only two states, Connecticut (whose constitution con-
tained no double jeopardy clause) and Wisconsin, authorized the
government to appeal an acquittal on the basis of error. Courts
in four other jurisdictions (Arkansas, Kentucky, Mississippi, and
North Carolina) held that acquittals resulting from the defen-
dant's fraud or collusion did not bar a second prosecution.
Courts in two states (Arkansas and West Virginia) only upheld
appeals of acquittals involving misdemeanors not punishable by
imprisonment. The settled rule in the vast majority of states was
that the double jeopardy principle (whether as a matter of con-
stitutional law, statutory law, or common law) barred the state
from appealing an acquittal.
B. The Double Jeopardy Treatment Of Government Appeals
Of Acquittals In Foreign Countries
Foreign jurisdictions take differing views as to the double
jeopardy status of government appeals of acquittals. Below we
briefly survey the treatment accorded such appeals in several
common law and civil law jurisdictions.
Canada, unlike the United States, grants the government a
limited right to appeal from acquittals. Section 11(h) of the Ca-
nadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms provides that "[a]ny
person charged with an offence has the right if finally acquitted
of the offence, not to be tried for it again and, if finally found
guilty and punished for the offence, not to be tried for it again
or punished for it again. '22 8 The Canadian courts have stated
that this clause does not abridge the government's right to ap-
peal questions of law following an acquittal. In Regina v.
Morgentaler, Smoling and Scott,229 the Supreme Court of Ca-
nada held that section 11(h)
does not preclude the limited right of appeal against an
acquittal, given to the Crown in indictable matters on
questions of law alone, by s. 605 of the Criminal Code.
Such a right of appeal existed in Canada for almost 100
years prior to enactment of the Charter [of Rights] and
has become an established part of the criminal process.
228. Constitution Act 1982, pt. I (CANADIAN CHARTER OF RIGHTS AND FREEDOMS),
§ 11(h), reprinted in 1 CAN. CHARTER OF RIGHTS ANN. 1-3 (1987).
229. 22 D.L.R.4th 641 (Can. 1985).
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The word "finally" in this paragraph [section 11(h)] was
obviously intended to avoid abrogating this well-estab-
lished right of appeal. There are valid policy reasons for
permitting Crown appeals on questions of law alone to
ensure the correct and uniform interpretation of the
criminal law.230
English double jeopardy law has been summarized as follows:
In England there is a common law prohibition against a
person being twice put in peril for the same offense. Stat-
utory provision is made that no offender shall be liable to
be punished twice for the same offense, even as to sum-
mary proceedings in the magistrate's courts. The Crown
has no right of appeal in the case of an acquittal or
where the trial court has sustained a demurrer or mo-
tion to quash [judgment]. 2
1
The general English prohibition against government appeals
of acquittals was emphasized in Regina v. Middlesex Quarter
Sessions (Chairman), ex parte Director of Public Prosecu-
tions.2 ' In this case the (appellate) Divisional Court refused to
quash an acquittal, despite the trial judge's "deplorably irregu-
lar" decision to direct a verdict of not guilty shortly after the
prosecution had opened its case. In upholding the acquittal,
"however improperly obtained," Lord Chief Justice Goddard
twice referred to the absence of a single case setting aside an
acquittal after the recording of a verdict of not guilty.""3 The
general prohibition against government appeals of acquittals re-
mains settled law in England. 34 Section 36(1) of the Criminal
Justice Act 1972 for the first time gave the English prosecutor a
limited right to request an appellate review of a disputed point
230. This case holding is summarized in 2 CAN. CHARTER OF RIGHTS ANN. 16-7-11
(Sept.-Oct. 1986).
231. J. SIGLER, supra note 20, at 125 (quoting National Ass'n of County and Prose-
cuting Attorneys, A Comparative Study of Criminal Law Administration in the United
States and Great Britain, 50 J. CRIm. L. CRIMINOLOGY & POLICE Sci. 67 (1959)) (emphasis
added). In at least one sense the English treatment of appeals is more favorable to de-
fendants than the American rule; when a conviction has been quashed on appeal, the
English criminal defendant is put in the same position as if he had been acquitted by the
jury on the trial level. See id. at 130.
232. 2 Q.B. 758 (1952).
233. For a discussion of this case, see Note, Double Jeopardy: Appeals and Foreign
Convictions, 101 LAW Q. Rav. 15, 16 (1985).
234. See id. at 15-17.
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of law following a criminal acquittal. " This procedure is not,
however, an appeal: the acquittal stands, without regard to the
legal interpretation rendered by the appellate court.25 The
House of Lords has held, however, that an acquittal is not a bar
to subsequent criminal proceedings where the initial summary
trial before magistrates was so fundamentally flawed that it was
not a trial at all.
87
The double jeopardy principle is accorded great respect
throughout the British Commonwealth. Chief Justice Barwick of
the High Court of Australia has stated, for example, that "[a]
verdict of acquittal must not be challenged in a subsequent trial,
nor may the accused be denied the full benefit of such a ver-
dict."2" At the same time, however, New Zealand, India, Sri
Lanka, and South Africa have passed laws authorizing a govern-
ment appeal from an acquittal on a point of law. 8 9 The Austra-
lian states are divided on the question of Crown appeals. Tasma-
nia, for example, permits a Crown appeal, while New South
Wales allows "moot appeals" of legal questions that leave an ac-
quittal undisturbed." 0
Unlike the common law jurisdictions, countries with civil law
systems generally allow the government to appeal acquittals:
The French criminal procedure, like most of the civil law
systems, allows the prosecution a right of appeal from the
235. Criminal Appeal Act 1972, § 36(1), states that "[tihe Attorney General may, if
he desires the opinion of the Court of Appeal on a point of law which has arisen in the
case, refer that point to the court, and the court shall, in accordance with this section,
consider the point. and give their opinion on it." Section 36(1) is discussed in WALKER &
WALKER, THE ENGLISH LEGAL SYSTEM 506 (1985).
236. Criminal Appeal Act 1972, § 36(7), specifically provides that the outcome of an
appellate reference under section 36(1) shall have no effect upon the acquittal in that
case. WALKER & WALKER, supra note 235, at 506. Indeed, the acquittal defendant's iden-
tity "must not be disclosed during the proceedings in the Court of Appeal except by his
consent." Id. In short, section 36(1) is not designed to affect the outcome of the particu-
lar case in which the prosecution files a post-acquittal appellate reference. Rather, that
section is meant to facilitate "quick ruling" by the Court of Appeals "before a potentially
false decision of law has too wide a circulation in the courts." Id. at 506 (citing Re Attor-
ney-General's Reference (No. I of 1975), [1975] Q.B. 773, 778).
237. Regina v. Dorking Justices, 3 W.L.R. 142 (1984).
238. Regina v. Story and Another, 140 C.L.R. 364 (Austl. 1978).
239. M. FRIEDLAND, supra note 20, at 281 (citing New Zealand Crimes Act of 1961,
380-382; A. GLEDHILL, THE BRITISH COMMONWEALTH: INDIA 222 (1964); Agarwal v. State of
Maharashtra, 1963 A.I.R. (S.C.) 200 (India 1962); W. JENNINGS & H. TAMBIAH, THE BRIT-
ISH COMMONWEALTH: CEYLON 297-298 (1952); and A. LANSDOWN, OUTLINES OF SOUTH AFRI-
CAN CRIMINAL LAW AND PROCEDURE 305 ff. (2d ed. 1960)).
240. M. FRIEDLAND, supra note 20, at 281, 299 (citing Tasmanian Criminal Code of
1924, §§ 399 if.; Vallance v. Regina, 108 C.L.R. 56 (Tasmania 1961); and Regina v. S.,
N.S.W. St. R. 460 (New South Wales 1953)).
Double Jeopardy
Journal of Law Reform
judgment of the court of first instance in most cases. This
is permitted even though the purpose be to secure a more
severe sentence, and "since this procedure is generally
alien to common law concepts, there may be a tendency
to regard it with suspicion and to ask whether it is not
counter to the constitutional right against double jeop-
ardy or to due process of law." '
Thus, for example, even Japan-apparently the only civil law
jurisdiction to have enacted a constitutional double jeopardy
clause"4 -permits state appeals from prior acquittals. 24 The
government, however, must apply to the Japanese Supreme
Court before filing an appeal.2" In Italy, a "criminal judgment
may be reviewed as to fact or law, or both . . . [all of] the par-
ties to the initial proceedings [the judge, the public prosecutor,
and the accused] have a complete discretion as to the initiation
of any further proceedings for the review of the decision of first
instance.
2 4 5
In short, England does not permit the government to appeal
acquittals. England does, however, allow the subsequent crimi-
nal prosecution of an acquitted defendant if the initial proceed-
ing was so "fundamentally flawed" that it was not a trial at all.
Several Commonwealth jurisdictions (Canada, India, New Zea-
land, Sri Lanka, South Africa, and two Australian states) afford
the government some right to appeal questions of law following
an acquittal. The government generally is allowed to appeal
criminal trial court determinations-including acquittals-in
civil law jurisdictions.
241. J. SIGLER, supra note 20, at 140 (quoting Snee & Pye, Due Process in Criminal
Procedure: A Comparison of Two Systems, 21 OHIO ST. L.J. 467, 499 (1960)). While
Sigler mentioned appeals of sentences, it appears clear from context that Sigler was re-
ferring to appeals of acquittals as well as convictions.
242. Id. at 141 (citing article 39 of the Japanese Bill of Rights, which provides that
"no person shall be held criminally liable for an act which was lawful at the time it was
committed, or of which he has been acquitted, nor shall he be placed in double
jeopardy").
243. Id. at 144 (citing Abe, Criminal Procedure in Japan, 48 J. CRIM. L. CRIMINOLOGY
& POLICE Scl. 365 (1957)).
244. Id.
245. G. CERTOMA, THE ITALIAN LEGAL SYsTEM 248 (1985).
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IV. POLICY RAMIFICATIONS
This section briefly considers the policy ramifications of the
double jeopardy clause's application to appeals of acquittals.
The discussion begins with a review and assessment of the policy
arguments for and against allowing government appeals of ac-
quittals. Although the arguments favoring appeals seem strong-
est, it appears that they generally must be rejected in light of
the double jeopardy clause's original meaning. The discussion
then turns to a possible limited program the government may
wish to consider pursuing in order to secure some additional
convictions of culpable individuals in the face of unfavorable
trial court dispositions. Such a program might stress that the
double jeopardy clause in no way precludes government appeals
in criminal trials, when such appeals would not result in a new
trial. The Justice Department might consider seeking explicit ju-
dicial recognition of the government's right to appeal errors of
law in a bench trial, when findings of fact clearly support a
guilty verdict. The Report closes by suggesting that a follow-up
study be done of additional ways in which society's interest in
ascertaining the truth in criminal proceedings might be served
through government appeals that do not violate the double jeop-
ardy clause. Such a study might examine: (1) whether govern-
ment appeals of errors of law in jury trials by special verdict
could be allowed, consistent with the sixth amendment's guaran-
tee of a trial by jury in criminal prosecutions; and (2) the possi-
ble use of pretrial appealable orders (agreed upon at a pretrial
conference) framing charges to the jury, and resolving eviden-
tiary questions in advance of trial.
A. Policy Arguments For And Against Allowing Government
Appeals
Policy arguments in favor of allowing government appeals of
acquittals have been advanced since the early part of this cen-
tury. In his dissent in United States v. Kepner, Justice Holmes
stressed that since convicted defendants were allowed to appeal
errors at the trial court level, by a parity of reasoning the gov-
ernment should be entitled to appeal errors prejudicial to its in-
terests that resulted in acquittals. Both situations, according to
Double Jeopardy
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Holmes, involved "one continuing jeopardy," rather than double
jeopardy.246
Over 20 years later, a Yale Law Journal commentary deemed
it an "absurdity" that a verdict favoring the defendant (an ac-
quittal) should be treated as conclusive, while a verdict favoring
the government (a conviction) should be treated as inconclu-
sive.24 According to that commentary, state laws authorizing
government appeals of acquittals would help ensure that a
higher proportion of culpable individuals are brought to justice;
would prevent individual miscarriages of justice; would improve
the quality of substantive and procedural law by correcting trial
court errors; and would encourage better behavior by counsel for
defendants, thereby increasing the prestige of criminal law
practice. 48
In 1935, the American Law Institute (ALI) voted to approve a
final draft on Administration of the Criminal Law which set
forth the following rule: "Where a person has been acquitted
generally, and in the course of the trial a material error has been
made to the prejudice of the State, the State shall be entitled to
a new trial.' 2 49 In adopting this rule, the American Law Institute
implicitly relied on the theory that the appeal of an acquittal
involves "one continuing jeopardy." '
A 1960 Harvard Law Review article concluded that, in place
of the rigid constitutional rule forbidding government appeals of
acquittals, "a flexible rule balancing protection of the individual
against the state's interest in securing convictions seems prefera-
ble."12 5' According to that article, it is not clear that allowing
government appeals would necessarily diminish the protection
afforded defendants. The article maintained that, if appeals
were allowed, the government would come under constitutional
pressure to present all its claims at one trial, rather than with-
hold some claims and pursue a new indictment and trial in the
246. 195 U.S. 100, 134-37 (1904).
247. Miller, Appeals by the State in Criminal Cases, 36 YALE L.J. 486, 496 (1927).
248. See id. at 503-512. At the time this commentary was written, state statutes per-
mitting government appeals of acquittals were not deemed contrary to the federal Con-
stitution; the Supreme Court did not hold that the double jeopardy clause applied to the
States (through the fourteenth amendment) until 1969. See Benton v. Maryland, 395
U.S. 784 (1969).
249. ALl: DouBLE JEOPARDY, supra note 218, at 13.
250. Id. at 112 (commentary to § 13, citing Connecticut cases). The ALl acknowl-
edged that its proposal ran counter to the trend in the law, admitting that "[t]he only
state in which the state may after an acquittal secure a new trial for errors on the first
trial prejudicial to the state is Connecticut." Id. The ALl has not revisited the double
jeopardy issue since 1935.
251. Mayers & Yarbrough, supra note 99, at 14.
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event the first trial resulted in an acquittal.252 Consistent with
this reasoning, another commentary concluded that "a proce-
dure allowing retrial only where error existed should be pre-
ferred by an accused to the present system, under which the
prosecution may secure retrial without regard to the fairness of
the first trial by obtaining a second indictment almost indistin-
guishable from the first.
25 3
Although.there is considerable force to these policy arguments
in support of allowing government appeals of acquittals, it must
be acknowledged that not all commentaries have viewed such
appeals in a favorable light. It has been argued, for example: (1)
that a rule barring retrials following an acquittal by the
factfinder has the desirable effect of preventing the wrongful
conviction of some innocent people; 24 (2) that unrestricted gov-
ernment appeals of acquittals could lead to unjustified harass-
ment of individuals; 255 (3) that the government appeal of an ac-
quittal unjustifiably frustrates the defendant's interests by
increasing the chance of an erroneous conviction;256 and (4) that
government should not be allowed to capitalize on the increased
probability of conviction resulting from reprosecution of an ac-
252. See id. The article also speculated that the doctrine of collateral estoppel has
been applied restrictively, to the defendant's detriment, "perhaps again as a product of
the innate desire to afford the state a chance at some point to present a case against the
defendant free from error." Id. at 14-15 (citation omitted). "Under current law, a defen-
dant, whether acquitted or convicted at a first trial, may be confronted with identical
evidence at a second trial for an offense that could have been joined and tried in the
initial prosecution. The [double jeopardy] clause bars such an action only if the offenses
in each trial are the 'same.'" Note, The Double Jeopardy Clause as a Bar to Reintro-
ducing Evidence, 89 YALE L.J. 962, 963 (1980); see also Thomas, The Prohibition of
Successive Prosecutions for the Same Offense: In Search of a Definition, 71 IowA L.
REv. 323 (1986)(discussing Supreme Court standards for determining whether successive
prosecutions are aimed at the "same offense").
253. Note, Statutory Implementation of Double Jeopardy Clauses: New Life for a
Moribund Constitutional Guarantee, 65 YALE L.J. 339, 362 (1956). According to that
commentary, "the interest of the community in convicting the guilty would be advanced
under a system that would guarantee one fair and full opportunity to try the case against
the accused instead of conditioning allowance of a second trial on the accident of
whether more than one 'offense' can be squeezed out of a criminal transaction, or on the
artfulness of a prosecutor framing indictments." Id; see also Kirchheimer, The Act, the
Offense and Double Jeopardy, 58 YALE L.J. 513, 542 (1949) (stressing that "prosecutors
often utilize the 'different offense'-'same evidence' technique only in order to further
the goals of justice, i.e., where the previous proceedings have ended with a legally unjus-
tifiable acquittal which cannot be reversed due to statutory prohibition of state
appeals").
254. See Stern, Government Appeals of Sentences: A Constitutional Response to
Arbitrary and Unreasonable Sentences, 18 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 51, 71-72 (1980).
255. See Comment, Double Jeopardy Limitations on Appeals by the Government in
Criminal Cases, 80 DICK. L. Rav. 525, 535 (1980).
256. See Comment, supra note 117, at 349.
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quitted defendant.s1 The first, third, and fourth points are es-
sentially variations of the same argument.
We find the nonconstitutional policy arguments against al-
lowing appeals of acquittals unconvincing. Any trial creates a
theoretical risk of convicting the innocent. There is no reason to
believe that this risk is any greater on retrial following an ac-
quittal than at an initial trial. Furthermore, because retrials fol-
lowing acquittals would be premised on trial error, we believe
that such retrials would often yield additional convictions of
guilty individuals without creating a significant risk of the
wrongful conviction of innocent persons. Allowing government
appeals would do no more than accord recognition to society's
interest in having one fair, error-free opportunity to establish
the truth and bring a criminal to justice. That interest outweighs
any interest the defendant may have in the unassailability of an
acquittal that was demonstrably caused or facilitated by error in
the trial proceedings. Moreover, the defendant's rights would no
more be "jeopardized" by appeals of acquittals than by mistrials
or hung juries that result in new trials. In both situations the
government is afforded another opportunity to establish guilt
following a defective or inconclusive earlier proceeding, and the
case for providing such an opportunity is particularly strong
where it can be established to the satisfaction of an appellate
court that the earlier proceeding was infected by error prejudi-
cial to the government.
Furthermore, in light of the great solicitude accorded the
rights of the defendant under our criminal justice system and
control over the reversal and retrial decisions by an impartial
court of appeals, we believe that government appeals would not
bring about "unjustified harassment" of individuals. The possi-
bility of a government appeal on the ground of error would,
however, diminish the incentive for the defense to attempt to
interject legal and factual errors into trial proceedings, in the
hope of securing unjustified acquittals. Under the current one-
sided approach, in contrast, such tactics may be relatively at-
tractive from a defense standpoint." 8
In sum, we believe that a government right of appeal would
tend to promote the fairness and expeditiousness of criminal tri-
als, thus increasing the probability of correct verdicts and en-
hancing the efficiency of criminal adjudication. The search for
truth in criminal justice would thereby be promoted.
257. See Note, Twice in Jeopardy, 75 YALE L.J. 262, 267 (1965).
258. See generally M. FRANKEL, PARTISAN JUSTICE 49-58 (1978).
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Nevertheless, we believe that a general rule authorizing the
government to appeal all acquittals-at least to the extent such
appeals result in new trials-must be rejected on constitutional
grounds. As Part I of this Report demonstrates, the double jeop-
ardy clause, read in accordance with its original meaning, does
not appear to permit the government to appeal an acquittal of a
felony in order to obtain a new trial, except perhaps in three
special cases.2" While the Constitution could, of course, be
amended to allow the government to appeal acquittals, we do
not recommend that the Department advocate such an amend-
ment. Given the longstanding English and American legal tradi-
tion that. looks upon appeals of acquittals with disfavor (a tradi-
tion reflected in the practice of most states before
incorporation), an amendment authorizing appeals would pre-
dictably generate a furor. Accordingly, despite the strong public
policy reasons in favor of allowing government appeals, we be-
lieve that such a constitutional modification would stand no re-
alistic chance of being adopted.
Nevertheless, we are not precluded from advancing a more
limited program, aimed at securing some additional convictions
of culpable individuals in the face of unfavorable trial court dis-
positions. Possible initiatives that might be pursued as part of
such a program are considered below.
B. Vindication Of The Government's Right To Appeal
Certain Acquittals
In light of the original meaning principles derived in this Re-
port, the Justice Department may wish to develop a program
aimed at vindicating the government's right to appeal acquittals
in certain limited, well-defined situations. The Department may
wish to set the stage for this program through articles or ad-
dresses highlighting the original meaning of the double jeopardy
clause, as applied to government appeals.
First, the Department could emphasize that the double jeop-
ardy clause in no way precludes government appeals in criminal
259. These three cases, recognized by Hawkins, supra note 55, and Hale, supra note
58, would authorize a government appeal when the trial court lacked jurisdiction, when
the initial indictment was defective, or when the law was mistakenly applied to findings
of fact supporting a guilty verdict. See supra text accompanying notes 55-59. Contrary to
the Supreme Court's Ex parte Lange, 85 U.S. (18 Wall.) 163 (1873) holding, original
meaning analysis suggests that there should be no constitutional barrier to government
appeals of acquittals in misdemeanor cases.
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cases, when such appeals would not result in new trials. This
fundamental proposition repeatedly has been recognized by the
Supreme Court in recent years.260 Analysis of the double jeop-
ardy clause's original meaning261 tends to support that proposi-
tion: the evil at which the clause generally appears to have been
directed is the threat of multiple trials or multiple punishments.
The Department could emphasize the importance of that
principle in public pronouncements and in briefs filed in court.
In addition to case law references, our argument could be sup-
ported by strong policy statements. Thus, we might focus on the
important public interest in promoting the search for truth in
criminal trials to ensure that criminally culpable individuals are
brought to justice. Government appeals may advance that vital
goal by overturning erroneous court rulings that would otherwise
allow criminals to go free. The incarceration or other punish-
ment of a higher proportion of criminals would provide socially
desired response to wrongful activity. It would also further pro-
tect the public, by removing dangerous individuals from the
streets and by creating additional disincentives to criminal con-
duct. We also should emphasize that the appellate determina-
tion of questions of law, arising out of appeals that would not
bring about new trials, would not constitute harassment of
defendants.
Justice Department controls over the filing of appeals would
further minimize the risk of unfairness to defendants. In short,
we should take advantage of favorable legal precedents and pol-
icy considerations to argue that all government appeals of ac-
quittals are permissible, when such appeals are based on errors
of law and do not require retrial of the defendant.
Second, the Department could point out that while the double
jeopardy clause bars most government appeals of acquittals,
there are certain exceptions to this rule. Specifically, given the
writings of Hawkins and Hale, the Department could explain
that the double jeopardy clause, properly understood, does not
bar the government from appealing an acquittal when the law
260. See United States v. Martin Linen Supply Co., 430 U.S. 564, 569-70 (1977)
("where a government appeal presents no threat of successive prosecutions, the Double
Jeopardy Clause is not offended"); United States v. Jenkins, 420 U.S. 358, 365 (1975)
("the Double Jeopardy Clause does not prohibit an appeal by the Government provided
that a retrial would not be required in the event the Government is successful in its
appeal"); United States v. Wilson, 420 U.S. 332, 345 (1975) ("a defendant has no legiti-
mate claim to benefit from an error of law when that error could be corrected without
subjecting him to a second trial before a second trier of fact").
261. See supra Part I.
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was mistakenly applied in a bench trial to findings of fact sup-
porting a guilty verdict." '
We recommend that the Department consider seeking an ap-
propriate case to argue that the government is entitled to appeal
a bench trial acquittal, when correction of the error would allow
a verdict of guilty to be entered without a new trial. The follow-
ing discussion focuses on the merits-and possible draw-
backs-of this initiative. " This discussion proceeds in light of
the fact that the United States, under 18 U.S.C. § 3731, enjoys
broad statutory authority to file appeals in criminal cases, sub-
ject to the limitations imposed by the double jeopardy clause.2"
We believe that the Department would stand an excellent
chance of obtaining sanction for government appeals of errors of
law in a bench trial, when findings of fact clearly support a
guilty verdict. In a bench trial, an erroneous interpretation of
law or a misapplication of law to the facts may yield a "legally
defective" verdict of acquittal. If an appellate court determines
that the trial judge actually resolved against the defendant all of
the factual issues necessary to support a finding of guilt, and
would have found him guilty under the correct legal standard, it
262. Departmental statements could also mention the existence of original meaning
evidence supporting the government's right to appeal an acquittal: (1) in a misdemeanor
case; (2) when the trial court lacked jurisdiction; and (3) when the initial indictment was
defective. We would not recommend, however, focusing heavily (if at all) on these areas,
inasmuch as we do not recommend that appeals be brought invoking these three
exceptions.
263. We do not recommend that the Department seek to appeal a misdemeanor ac-
quittal on the ground that the double jeopardy clause does not apply to misdemeanors.
It is extremely unlikely that the Supreme Court would overturn Ex parte Lange, 85 U.S.
(18 Wall.) 163 (1873), which holds to the contrary. Similarly, we do not recommend that
the Department seek to appeal an acquittal on the ground that the original indictment
was defective. United States v. Ball, 163 U.S. 662 (1896), which holds that even legally
defective indictments place an individual in jeopardy, would not likely be overruled by
the Supreme Court. Moreover, an attempt to overturn Ball would undoubtedly confront
the argument that such a reversal of well-established precedent would unfairly authorize
government prosecutors to benefit from their own mistakes (defective indictments). Fi-
nally, we do not recommend that the Department seek to appeal an acquittal on the
ground that the trial court lacked jurisdiction. We presume that in federal criminal adju-
dications that proceed through trial to a final verdict, the trial court will very rarely lack
subject matter jurisdiction over the matter that was adjudicated.
264. The first paragraph of 18 U.S.C. § 3731 (Supp. II 1984) specifies that:
Ii]n a criminal case an appeal by the United States shall lie to a court of appeals
from a decision, judgment, or order of a district court dismissing an indictment
or information or granting a new trial after verdict or judgment, as to any one or
more counts, except that no appeal shall lie where the double jeopardy clause of
the United States Constitution prohibits further prosecution.
This encompasses any constitutionally permissible appeal by the government of a trial
court disposition favorable to the defendant. See United States v. Wilson, 420 U.S. 332,
336-39 (1975).
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would be appropriate for the higher court to order the entry of a
verdict of guilty in place of the "mistaken" verdict of acquittal.
By not requiring a new trial, such an action by the reviewing
court would remain faithful to the apparent general purpose of
the constitutional double jeopardy principle.
Support for this approach can be drawn from the following
statement in United States v. Jenkins:" 5
If the [trial] court prepares special findings of fact. . . it
may be possible upon sifting those findings to determine
that the court's finding of 'not guilty' is attributable to
an erroneous conception of law whereas the court has re-
solved against the defendant all of the factual issues nec-
essary to support a finding of guilt under the correct legal
standard."6
Once an appellate court's "sifting" of the facts indicates that a
verdict of guilty should have been entered, it follows logically
that such a verdict can be entered immediately. The conclusion
is supported by the Supreme Court's recognition (based on its
holding in United States v. Wilson) "that the Double Jeopardy
Clause does not bar an appeal when errors of law may be cor-
rected and the result of such correction will simply be a rein-
statement of a jury's verdict of guilty or a judge's finding of
guilt.
267
The proposed judicial clarification of the United States' au-
thority to appeal errors of law in bench trials does, however,
have one drawback: by allowing certain appeals from bench trial
acquittals it somewhat increases a defendant's incentive to re-
quest a jury trial, rather than a bench trial. As a result, the pro-
portion of bench trials relative to jury trials may fall. To the
extent bench trials are less likely to result in the wrongful ac-
quittal of a defendant, the greater use of jury trials might para-
doxically bring about a fall (rather than a rise) in the conviction
rate of guilty individuals.
The likelihood of this paradoxical result occurring may, how-
ever, be rather small. It is not- at all clear that the proposed case
265. 420 U.S. 358, 367 (1975).
266. FED. R. CRIM. P. 23(c) reads: "In a case tried without a jury the court shall make
a general finding and shall in addition on request find the facts specially. If an opinion or
memorandum of decision is filed, it will be sufficient if the findings of fact appear
therein." The Supreme Court's reference to "special findings" in Jenkins was dictum,
since the Court could not find a clear trial court resolution of factual issues against the
defendant in that case.
267. United States v. Jenkins, 420 U.S. at 368.
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law clarification would substantially affect a defendant's incen-
tive to opt for a jury trial. Moreover, assuming proper federal
court judicial supervision of jury trials, it is not apparent to
what extent jury trials are more likely than bench trials to yield
wrongful acquittals. Finally, any rise in wrongful acquittals at-
tributable to jury trials would have to be weighed against any
fall in wrongful acquittals stemming from government appeals of
bench trial verdicts.
On balance, we believe that a judicial recognition of the gov-
ernment's authority to appeal from a bench trial acquittal on
the ground of legal error probably would be desirable. Neverthe-
less, the Department should not fail to weigh the possibility that
such a judicial recognition might paradoxically increase (rather
than decrease) the incidence of wrongful acquittals in deciding
whether to pursue this issue.
C. Follow-Up Study On Government Appeals Of Acquittals
This Report closes by recommending that a follow-up study
be done of additional ways in which society's interest in ascer-
taining the truth in criminal proceedings might be served
through government appeals that do not violate the double jeop-
ardy clause. Such a study might examine: (1) whether govern-
ment appeals of errors of law in jury trials by special verdict
could be allowed, consistent with the sixth amendment's guaran-
tee of a trial by jury in criminal prosecutions; 6 8 and (2) the pos-
sible use of pretrial appealable orders (agreed upon at a pretrial
conference) framing charges to the jury, and resolving eviden-
tiary issues.
1. Government Appeal of an Acquittal, Based on Errors of
Law, in a Jury Trial by Special Verdict
First, the follow-up study might explore whether the govern-
ment has the authority to appeal, on the ground of legal error,
an acquittal in a criminal jury trial by special verdict, when the
findings of fact support a guilty verdict. In justifying such an
appeal, the Department could invoke the eighteenth century un-
derstanding (expressed by Hale) that an appeal is not barred
268. The sixth amendment question is whether the original meaning of the criminal
jury trial guarantee permits verdicts on special questions.
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when facts adduced at trial supported a finding of guilt, but the
trial court erroneously held that the act committed was not a
crime. The Department could also point out in support of such
an appeal right that the correction of trial court legal errors
would not require a new trial. Because a special verdict (similar
to special findings in a bench trial) sets forth with precision the
factual predicates underlying a verdict, the correction of legal
error on appeal presumably would allow a verdict of guilty to be
entered without further trial court proceedings. Thus, constitu-
tional objections to appeals resulting in new trials could not le-
gitimately be raised.
Opponents of such an appeal right might rejoin that there is
little direct evidence that eighteenth century American lawyers
accepted Hale's understanding that legal errors undermining ac-
quittals could be reversed on appeal.269 Perhaps more signifi-
cantly, critics might argue that a special verdict procedure per-
mitting the displacement of an acquittal would violate a
criminal defendant's sixth amendment right to a trial by jury. In
order to assess (and, if appropriate, rebut) such an argument,
the follow-up study should explore the original meaning of the
sixth amendment's jury trial guarantee.
2. Pretrial Appealable Orders, Framing Charges to the Jury
Second, the follow-up study might explore the use of pretrial
appealable orders, framing charges to the jury and resolving evi-
dentiary issues. Such orders would be arrived at in a pretrial
conference involving the judge, the prosecution, and the defen-
dant. They would permit the government to appeal from legal
error, while subjecting the defendant to only one trial. Govern-
ment authorization to appeal pretrial orders dealing with jury
instructions and resolving evidentiary issues would require an
appropriate amendment to the federal government appeals stat-
ute, 18 U.S.C. § 3731.270
269. The only early American case we have found that approvingly cites Hale for this
proposition is State v. Buchanan, 5 H. & J. 317 (Md. 1821) (discussed supra at text
accompanying note 207).
270. The second paragraph of 18 U.S.C. § 3731 already provides for appeal by the
government "from a decision or order of a district court suppressing or excluding evi-
dence or requiring the return of seized property in a criminal proceeding, not made after
the defendant has been put in jeopardy and before the verdict or finding on an indict-
ment or information."
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Opponents of such a statutory reform might refer to the diffi-
culty of deciding upon appropriate jury instructions at the pre-
trial stage. They might also cite the general policy that disfavors
expansion of interlocutory appeals. Accordingly, the follow-up
report should discuss possible ways of countering these argu-
ments. For example, the government might respond that in
many criminal prosecutions the issues would have been suffi-
ciently well developed by the time of trial as to permit draft jury
instructions. When this was not the case, the statute would not
require that jury charges be prepared. Furthermore, the govern-
ment might stress that the social benefits stemming from the
correction of plain errors would outweigh the additional burden
on the judicial system associated with occasional government ap-
peals of jury instructions. Finally, the government might point
out that authorizing the appeal of jury instructions might at
times work in the defendant's favor. At present, some judges
may have an incentive to "bend over backward" in close cases
and not frame questionable jury instructions that would favor
the defendant, since judges know that the government cannot
appeal instructions on the ground of legal error after an acquit-
tal. This incentive would be eliminated by a provision allowing
the government to appeal jury charges.
In short, a statutory change providing for the pretrial framing
of appealable jury instructions might guard against legal error
prejudicial to the government more effectively without jeopard-
izing other legitimate interests. Accordingly, such a modification
merits serious consideration in a follow-up report.
CONCLUSION
The review of the policies implicated by government appeals
of acquittals prompts two general conclusions. First, based on
constitutional considerations, the Department should not assert
a general right to appeal acquittals. Second, this general conclu-
sion is subject to a few exceptions. In light of those exceptions,
the Department should consider seeking an appropriate case to
argue that the government can constitutionally appeal a bench
trial acquittal, on the ground of legal error, when correction of
the error would allow a verdict of guilty to be entered without a
new trial. The Department should weigh the benefits against the
potential drawbacks of such an initiative. Finally, this Report
closes by recommending that a follow-up study be done of addi-
tional ways in which society's interest in ascertaining the truth
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in criminal proceedings might be served through government ap-
peals that do not violate the double jeopardy clause.
